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CHAPTER ONE – THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS QUO

A. Introduction

The report of Justice Catherine McGuinness following the Kilkenny Incest
Inquiry in 19931 represented the first of a series of authoritative appeals for
constitutional change to more effectively protect the rights of children.
Subsequent examples include the report of the Constitutional Review Group2 and
several ‗concluding observations‘ produced by the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child3. These reports have been accompanied by calls constitutional
change from academia4, interest groups5 and members of the judicial branch6.
These appeals are predicated on the idea that the constitution is failing to protect
children and must be amended to allow it to properly do so. To assess these
claims, it is necessary to examine the current state of constitutional law in this
area. Chapter one will be devoted to this exercise.
1

Kilkenny Incest Investigation: Report presented to Mr. Brendan Howlin TD, Minister for Health
by South Eastern Health Board (1993) Dublin: Stationery Office.
2
Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996) Dublin Stationery Office
3
See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Ireland, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.85 (1998)
4
Examples include Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin (1996);
Shannon, Child Law, Thompson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p 45; Conor O'Mahony, Children,
Parents and Education Rights: A Constitutional Imbalance Irish Journal of Family Law, (2004)
7(3) IJFL 3; Fergus W. Ryan, Recognising Family Diversity: Children, One-Parent Families and
the Law, (2006) 9(1) IJFL 3.
5
Examples include The Children‘s Rights Alliance, Small Voices, Vital Rights, Submission to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (1997); Children‘s Rights Alliance, Submission to the
Joint Committee on Child Protection, August 2006; submissions by Aim Family Services [at p
A21], Barnardos [at p A 36] and the Church of Ireland [at p A 42] to the All Party Oireachtas
Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006..
6
See, in particular, the judgment of Mrs Justice McGuinness in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374 at 498.
See also, DPP v JT [1988] 3 Frewen 141; Southern Health Board v CH [1996] 1 IR 231; DPP v
Best [2000] 2 IR 17.
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The concept of child protection has not been overly influential in constitutional
law due, at least in part, to the lack of any special emphasis on children in the
Constitution. Moreover, the constitutional status of the marital child has been
further obscured by the virtually unique7 and wide ranging deference the
Constitution affords to the marital family.

This chapter will assess the current state of the law primarily through an
examination, firstly, of the constitutional provisions and secondly, of
unenumerated children‘s rights and the academic opinion thereon. The aim is to
illustrate that, far from providing adequate protections for children, the
Constitution is fundamentally incapable of adequately protecting children in its
current formulation. Furthermore, it will be argued that the courts have not erred
in their interpretation of the law and have merely presented the constitutional
status of the child as it was meant to be interpreted. The wording of the relevant
provisions made and makes it unlikely for any other conclusion to be occasioned.

B. The Constitutional Provisions

Constitutional Provisions on the The Family

7

As the authors of JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution comment, the articles were among the most
innovatory in the Constitution and there were no similar provisions in the 1922 Constitution.
They do, however note that there was a similar provision in the German Constitution of 1919.
See JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1827-1828. They are innovatory too in the sense that such provisions
are comparatively rare, as Beytagh comments: ―Only a limited number of modern constitutions of
consequence contain specific provisions dealing with the protection of he family, and none
contain language as a sweeping as that in Article 41‖ [Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Ireland: An American Perspective, RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1997 at
p 37.]. Therefore the protections are referred to as ―virtually unique‖.

5

The Constitution of Ireland, adopted in 1937, guaranteed a novel degree of legal
protection for the family. It was promised that the State would recognise ―the
family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society‖ 8. Crucially,
Article 41.3.1° provides that the ―…State pledges itself to guard with special care
the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it
against attack.‖ The rights that are afforded to the marital family are said to be
―inalienable and imprescriptible‖9 which has been held to mean that they cannot
be surrendered, given away, lost or forfeited over time10. It is now widely
accepted that the Constitution refers to is the marital family in accordance with
State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála11 and Costello J‘s decision in Murray v
Ireland12, subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in TF v Ireland13.

The aforementioned Article 41 rights accorded to the family are to be understood
as vesting in the family unit itself rather than the individuals members of the
family14. Therefore, the Constitution can be seen to afford the marital family
such a degree of deference that Shannon felt that the Constitution establishes the
family ―as a sort of Independent republic‖15, albeit within certain exceptional
limits16. Such a formulation inevitably has the potential of limiting the protection
of children as it restricts the State from interfering with potentially damaging acts
done by marital parents towards their children.

8

Article 41.1.1°
Article 41.1.1°
10
Per Barrington J in Fajujonu v Minister for Justice [1990] IR 151 at 157.
11
State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567.
12
Murray v Ireland [1982] IR 532.
13
TF v Ireland [1995] 1 IR 321.
14
Per Costello J in Murray v Ireland [1985] IR 532.
15
Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p 2.
16
Limits including, inter alia, the Article 42.5 limits (see below) and in exceptional cases such as
in the case of Baby Janice (unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004) (see below at p 7).
9
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Constitutional Provisions on Education

The Constitution makes its most explicit references to children in Article 42
which is entitled ―Education‖. Article 42.4 guarantees the child free primary
education and makes a promise on the part of the State to aid ―educational
initiative‖ and to provide facilities where the public good requires it. However
these promises are made ―with due regard… to the rights of the parents…‖
Indeed, the general language of Article 42 suggests that the Article should be
read more as a consolidation of parents‘ rights (albeit in relation to their children)
than as affording special rights and protections to children.

Only Article 42.5 deviates from the rest of the Article‘s parental autonomy focus
in that it provides that the state will supply the place of the parents ―for
exceptional reasons, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their
duty towards their children‖. This would appear to be a vital provision as regards
the protection of children. Nevertheless, the superior courts appear to have
settled on a restrictive reading of this subsection. This development will be
addressed in more detail in section C of this chapter.

As already mentioned, the Constitution regards ‗the family‘ as the marital family
only. Consequently, many of the aforementioned ostensible protections afforded
to marital children are not likely apply to non-marital children. It appears that
natural parents have no rights in respect of their non-marital children under

7

Articles 41 and 4217. As such, there is no barrier to state intrusion similar to
Article 42.5 and the child‘s best interests takes precedence in such cases18.
However, Hogan and Whyte argue that it is ―scarcely possible that the
Constitution affords less protection to the autonomy of a stable non-marital
family than it does to that of its marital counterpart.‖ They argue that in such
circumstances the state would surely be limited by Article 42.5. Nevertheless, for
authority, the authors can only draw on ―an echo of this sentiment‖19 drawn from
the case of Eastern Health Board v MK20. At best, the Constitution is unclear as
regards to the protections available for non-marital children.

Other Provisions

The rights of the child are explicitly mentioned in two other provisions, neither
of which warrant serious attention in the current context. Article 44.2.4° provides
that a child has a right not to receive religious instruction at a school if it receives
public funds. This provision is of limited importance in several respects. Firstly,
this merely protects the child from direct instruction rather than from influence
from the religious ethos of the school21. Secondly, it might be seen as effectively
a further parental right to control their child‘s religious instruction. Even if
Article 44.2.4° was to be seen as providing a child‘s right, it is hardly a

17

Per gavan Duffy J in Re M, an Infant [1946] IR 334 at 334. However the natural mother does
have rights pursuant to Article 40.3 as laid down in State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966]
IR 567 at 664. The position of the natural father is less secure and less legally certain, see JM
Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth Edition,
Dublin, 2003 at p 1910.
18
Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at pp 5-69.
19
JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 1916.
20
Eastern Health Board v MK [1999] 2 IR 99 at 117-118.
21
JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 2068.
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substantial one. Furthermore, it has only been invoked in one case22 to date
according to the author‘s of Kelly‘s The Irish Constitution23. Moreover, in that
case, it was invoked by a parent rather than a child.

The child is also mentioned in Article 45 where the state pledges to protect
children from abuse and from being forced to enter into avocations unsuited to
their sex, age or strength24. The Article explicitly states that the provisions are to
be of ―general guidance‖ to the Oireachtas and to be not cognisable by any court.
The Supreme Court and the courts in general are undecided as to whether these
provisions can be referenced in courts25. Furthermore, the rights afforded would
seem to be self-evident and the protections are better provided elsewhere in the
Constitution. It should perhaps be noted that the directive principles of social
policy were influential in upholding the constitutionality of child labour laws26.

Conclusion

Therefore, explicit children‘s rights or protections do not appear in any
substantial way in the Constitution. The mentions of explicit non-marital
children‘s rights are even less noticeable. However, the caselaw holds that the
constitution provides unenumerated children‘s rights for marital and non-marital
children and, therefore, it is to this jurisprudence that we now turn.

22

Campaign to Separate Church and State v Minister for Education [1998] 2 ILRM 81.
JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 2068.
24
Article 45.4.2°
25
Compare, for example, the different approaches in Attorney General v Paperlink [1984] ILRM
373 and Kerry Co-op Creameries Ltd v An Bord Bainne [1990] ILRM 664.
26
See Landers v Attorney General [1973] 109 ILTR at 6.
23
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C. Unenumerated Constitutional Protections

Introduction

As already mentioned, Article 40 of the Constitution does not explicitly reference
the child. However, it is now settled law that the child has certain unenumerated
rights emanating from Article 40.3 of the Constitution. While these rights have
been espoused by the superior courts on numerous occasions, the most
authoritative statement comes from G v Bord Uchtála27 and especially O‘Higgins
CJ‘s dissent in that case. The then Chief Justice stated that: ―Having been born,
the child has the right to be fed and to live, to be reared and educated, to have the
opportunity of working and of realising his or her full personality and dignity as
a human being.‖28 This statement of the law was approved by the Supreme Court
in North Western Health Board v HW and CW29 and, in M v M30, Murphy J
confirmed that such rights extended to non-marital children.

Issues of Jurisdiction

However the fact that children are recognised as having rights is not enough to
ensure the enforcement of their rights. The problem is that in many cases the
child will be too young to enforce his own rights. Moreover, in many cases the
child‘s rights can only be exercised by third parties or their parents who may be
the parties who are infringing the child‘s rights. Consequently, the area of child
27

G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
Ibid at 55-56. Walsh and Parke JJ also made statements to similar effect.
29
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. For example, the judgment of Mrs
Justice Denham at 719.
30
M v M (unreported, 2 December 1982, High Court).
28
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protection is plagued by issues of jurisdiction and potentially further complicated
by separation of powers concerns.

Crucially, it seems that the Constitution is not structured to overcome this
problem. As Hardiman J cogently argued in North Western Health Board v HW
and CW31, the state may only intervene to vindicate Article 40.3 rights ―by its
laws‖32. He cited33 the following quote from Kenny J in Crowley v Ireland34 with
approval: ―It is not a general obligation to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen. It is a duty to do so by its laws, for it is through laws and by
laws that the State expresses the will of the people who are the ultimate
authority‖35. Therefore, in many cases, children‘s Article 40.3 rights will go
unenforced, absent any law providing for their enforcement. While state actors
might have general statutory obligations to protect children36, absent specific
legislation, their ability to carry this obligation through legally may be inhibited
by the constitutional deference given to the marital family37.

In HW and CW38, Mrs Justice Denham suggested – obiter – that such judicial
intervention might occur in the case of a medical or surgical procedure in relation
to a threat to life or serious injury39. This suggests that the courts can intervene in

31

North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
Ibid at 759.
33
Ibid at 759.
34
Crowley v Ireland [1980] IR 102.
35
Ibid at 130.
36
Such as under the s. 3(1) of the Child Care Act, 1991: ―It shall be a function of every health
board to promote the welfare of children in its area who are not receiving adequate care and
protection.‖
37
As, for example in North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622 where the fact
that the law did not make the PKU test compulsory meant that the Health Board had no
cognisance to supplant the judgment of the parents.
38
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
39
Ibid at 727.
32
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such a way in exceptional circumstances. This has now been established by the
case of Baby Janice40 which illustrates that the courts can intervene in such a
way in exceptional circumstances. However it is notable that the intervention in
that case involved making the child a ward of court41. The fact that the court felt
compelled to use this procedure rather than any constitutional norm suggests the
impotence of the latter. Furthermore the judgment was ex tempore and is the only
judicial authority in the form of a ratio decidendi that we can rely on for this
proposition. Consequently, the circumstances in which the courts will intervene
remain somewhat unclear.

Restrictive Interpretation of Article 42.5

It has been argued42 that authorities such as G43 represented a constitutional order
in which the rights of children could be adequately protected and that the courts
have subsequently retreated from this position unnecessarily. However it should
be noted that O‘Higgins CJ‘s judgment was a minority one. Indeed, in TD v
Minister for Education44, Chief Justice Keane referred to this fact and was
noticeably reluctant to explicitly approve the dicta45. Moreover, the majority in

40

Baby Janice (unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004). In that case the mother had signed a
consent for the unqualified use of blood and blood products but following an intervention from
her Jehovah's Witness community she had had withdrawn it. An urgent application was brought
before High Court where President Mr Justice Finnegan ordered that Janice be made a ward of
court and authorised the hospital to provide medical treatment as it deemed appropriate. As a
result of the court's intervention Janice had undergone major heart surgery on March 19th.
Although given a 50:50 chance of survival she had recovered well. [‗Court Extends Order for
Heart Surgery Baby’, Irish Times, Friday 6 August 2004].
41
‗Court Extends Order for Heart Surgery Baby’, Irish Times, Friday 6 August 2004.
42
See, for example, Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p. 6, and, Dr
Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running
to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19.
43
G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
44
TD v Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259.
45
―In his judgment, Murphy J points out that the proposition there laid down by the learned Chief
Justice was not expressly assented to by a majority of the court. It is also clear that the passage in
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G46 have not subsequently been overruled and it would seem that the best
interpretation might be that, in essence, the courts have implicitly accepted the
dicta of O‘Higgins CJ while not doubting the majority‘s ratio decidendi in G47. In
any event, in Re JH, an infant48, the Supreme Court adopted what can only be
interpreted as a restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 42.5 and child
protection generally.

Re JH, an infant49 concerned an adoption process where the full final consent had
not been given by the natural mother. The parents had married so, unlike G50, the
applicants could not obtain an order under s.3 of the Adoption Act, 1974 to
dispense with the refusal to consent. The adoptive parents were successful in
defending the claim in the High Court but the Supreme Court found for the
natural parents. The child had been with the adoptive parents for two years by the
time the case reached the Supreme Court. Finlay CJ delivered the judgment of
the court and what has been accepted as the authoritative statement of the law51.
He argued that there was a constitutional presumption that the best interests of
the child would be best secured in the marital family. Therefore, the Chief Justice
concluded, statutes like the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 would have to be
read in light of this presumption.

question is an application to the particular case of children of the doctrine of unenumerated rights
first laid down by the High Court and endorsed by this court in Ryan v Attorney General…
Whether the formulation adopted by Kenny J is an altogether satisfactory guide to the
identification of such rights is at least debatable.‖ Per Keane CJ in TD v Minister for Education
[2001] 4 IR 259 at 281.
46
G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
47
Ibid.
48
Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
49
Ibid.
50
G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
51
Statement of the law accepted by the Supreme Court in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374.

13

This presumption could only be rebutted in two situations, namely where ―there
are compelling reasons why this cannot be achieved, or unless the court is
satisfied that the evidence establishes an exceptional case where the parents have
failed to provide education for the child and to continue to fail to provide
education for the child for moral or physical reasons.‖52 The latter situation is
effectively the Article 42.5 situation where the state takes the place of parents
where they have failed in their parental obligations. The former represented a
new situation where the state could supply the place of the parents, namely where
there were compelling reasons that this should be done. It was not entirely clear
from the judgment what this new situation amounted to but subsequent
judgments have expanded upon it.

This ―compelling reasons‖ exception potentially represented the adoption of a
more flexible approach to child protection. As Casey noted, ―Presumably it [the
constitutional basis for the exception] springs from an acceptance that a child has
constitutional rights just as parents do… and that in a case of conflict there is no
rule giving parental rights primacy.‖53 Casey suggested that there was subsequent
authority for this proposition54. However the ―compelling reasons‖ test has been
interpreted as being applicable only ―in the most extreme circumstances‖55 and
the authors of Kelly conclude that ―the actual outcome reaffirms the adult-

52

Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375 at 395.
James Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Third Edition,
Dublin, 2000 at p 632.
54
For example, Walsh J in G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 at 78.
55
―Yet the test set by Finlay C.J. in his judgment – compelling reasons why the child‘s welfare
could not be achieved within the natural family – is so exacting that it would be difficult to see it
being met other than in the most extreme circumstances. This is particularly so when the test is
given the added weight of being set in the context of the constitutional declaration of the rights of
the family and of parents, and the related constitutional presumption that the welfare of the child
is to be found within the family [emphasis added].‖ Per McGuinness J in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR
374 at 496.
53
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orientated approach of earlier cases.‖56 This conclusion is corroborated by the
restrictive reading of Article 42.5 by the Supreme Court in State (Doyle) v
Minister for Education57.

In his excellent analysis of the decision58, William Duncan has suggested that Re
JH, an infant59 represented judicial re-assertion of the focus on parental
autonomy following controversy over the development of an ostensibly childcentred jurisprudence60 in the late 1970s and early 1980s started by the case of M
v Bord Uchtála6162. He claims that it was never clear how much judicial support
the jurisprudence had and that Re JH63 confirmed that it had little support in the
Supreme Court64.

Expanding the Scope of Article 42.5

However, despite Re JH, an infant65, it has been argued66 that there is still scope
for a more child-centred reading of Article 42.5. The most authoritative locus for
this argument is the Supreme Court case of In Re 26 and the Adoption (No. 2)

56

JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1925.
57
State (Doyle) v Minister for Education [1989] ILRM 277.
58
In WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ
59
Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375
60
Including the cases of J v D SC (unreported, 22 June 1977) and PW v AW (Unreported, High
Court, 21 April 1980).
61
M v Bord Uchtála [1977] IR 287.
62
WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ at p
76.
63
Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
64
WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ at p
76.
65
Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
66
See JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
Fourth Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1926-1927.
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Bill, 198767. Here, Finlay CJ – giving the judgment of the court – held that
Article 42.5 did not merely oblige the State to supply the place of the parents in
regard to education but also compelled the State to satisfy ―the parental duty to
cater for the other personal rights of the child.‖68 The court also deviated from
the previous decision of Doyle69 in that it accepted that Article 42.5 allowed for
legislation that would work on the basis of a permanent surrender of parents‘
rights70.

It is now settled law that Article 42.5 covers more than simply the education
rights of children. However, the decision is also cited in support of arguments
that the Constitution can support a more child centred rights approach than the
current one, a proposition that will now be assessed. Shannon also highlights the
Supreme Court case of Southern Health Board v CH71 to highlight a more childcentred jurisprudence emerging however the author accepts that this was rolled
back in HW v CW72.

Arguments for a More Child-Centred Interpretation of the Constitution

Both Conor O‘Mahony73 and Hogan & Whyte74 cite the case of PW v AW75. In
that case, Ellis J. refused to grant custody of a child to a mother with psychiatric

67

In Re Article 26 and the Adoption (No. 2) Bill 1987 [1989] ILRM 266.
Ibid at 272.
69
State (Doyle) v Minister for Education [1989] ILRM 277.
70
JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 1926
71
Southern Health Board v CH [1996] IR 219 .
72
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
73
Conor O'Mahony, Children, Parents and Education Rights: A Constitutional Imbalance Irish
Journal of Family Law, (2004) 7(3) IJFL 3.
74
JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1928.
68
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problems, finding that the child had natural rights by virtue of Article 41 that
were inalienable and imprescriptible. He felt that one of those rights was the right
to have his welfare regarded as the paramount consideration in disputes as to his
custody. Viewed in the wider context of the jurisprudence on the matter, PW v
AW76, which predates Re JH77 now seems of little authority. Furthermore, the
reasoning behind Ellis J‘s decision was explicitly criticised by Hardiman J. in
North Western Health Board v HW and CW78. He felt the decision was both
conceptually questionable and inconsistent with the law laid down in Re JH7980.

Regardless, Hogan and Whyte81 somewhat ambitiously argue that ―the principal
value of Ellis J‘s decision in the present context is that it indicates how a more
balanced approach to the more complex area of custody disputes… can be
achieved without re-evaluating the constitutional principles involved and without
the necessity of a constitutional amendment‖82. They also cite the disagreement,
in North Western Health Board v HW and CW83, between Keane CJ and
Hardiman J as to ―the state of the law in the aftermath of Re JH,‖ presumably to
support their previous claim84.
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This is a highly questionable assertion. Firstly, Keane CJ‘s dictum would appear
to be of limited authority given the fact that his was the sole dissenting judgment
in that case. Secondly, and as O‘Mahony pointed out85, the decision in PW v
AW86 sits very uncomfortably with the pre-existing and subsequent caselaw. It
was directly criticised by Hardiman J in North Western Health Board v HW and
CW87 and not even mentioned in the recent case of N v the Health Service
Executive88 which was also a custody dispute. These limitations in authority are
only amplified by the fact that PW v AW89 was a High Court decision.
Consequently, it is unlikely that PW v AW90 could be used as reliable authority
for the argument that the courts could yet mould the Constitution into a more
child-centred approach. As O‘Mahony put it, ―Ellis J.'s statement in isolation
fails to elevate this aspect of the principle [the welfare principle] to the
constitutional plane.‖91

O‘Mahony92 presents the argument that common law authority could be used to
support a more child-centred jurisprudence. He cites the English case of
Humphrys v Polack93 where it was held that rights given to parents regarding
their children are entirely to be used for the benefit of the relevant children and
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not the parents94. He notes that the statement was cited with approval by Gavan
Duffy J in Re M (an infant)95 and Teevan J in State (Nicolau) v An Bord
Uchtála9697. He then makes the tentative conclusion that the principle can
―therefore reasonably be assumed to be part of Irish law‖98.

While this may be the case in England, it seems unlikely that the principle is
compatible with the Constitution‘s protections of the family. Moreover, it is
notable that both Re M (an infant)99 and Nicolaou100 concerned cases of nonmarital children. One cannot presume that the statements would have been made
in the context of the constitutional institution of marriage. Even if they were, two
judicial mentions in isolation – that, in any event, predate Re JH, an infant –
hardly provide an authoritative basis for O‘Mahony‘s argument.

O‘Mahony also seeks to argue that the Supreme Court‘s finding in Re JH101 is
conceptually flawed on what he calls a ―technical point‖102. He points to the now
accepted principle103 that Article 41 creates rights for the family as a unit and
does not create any rights for the individual within it. He then proposes that Re
JH104 was flawed in that it attempted to give the child rights105 by virtue of
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Article 41106. However this argument would misrepresent the Supreme Court‘s
argument.

It was not proposed that the child was availing of any Article 41 rights as an
individual. Rather, the relevant Article 41 right was the right of the family – of
which the child was a member – not to be interfered with by the state. But this
was not the only right accruing. Crucially, as Duncan has observed, the only right
the child was afforded as an individual was his Article 42 right to be educated by
the family107. There was no such technical problem with Article 42 rights being
afforded to individuals and it was on this basis that the court concluded that the
child had a right to be part of a marital family absent ‗compelling reasons‘ or the
circumstances outlined in Article 42.5108.

Duncan concluded that the judgment ―hoisted the advocates of children‘s rights
on their own petard.‖109 It couched what were, to all intents and purposes,
parental rights in the language of children‘s rights. While Duncan accepted that
the Re JH110 standard did give some status to the welfare principle, he concluded
that ―it does not afford it either priority or equal standing with the parental right
to custody‖111 Ultimately, any parties to such actions who were not the marital
parents would have to resort to the ‗compelling reasons‘ test, one which Duncan
argued ―places a burden of proof on third parties which, given the uncertainty
106
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inherent in predicting the effects on a child of a custody charge, is extremely
difficult to discharge.‖112

Judicial Re-Assertion of the Pro-Parent Approach – North Western Health
Board v HW and CW

Much of these arguments and the previous caselaw came up for consideration in
North Western Health Board v HW and CW113 and a more detailed analysis of
the case is of value. In the case, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the
case of a newly born baby, whose parents had refused consent for a free, standard
but non-compulsory (at least in statutory terms) PKU test which could test for a
range of disorders which could be very damaging unless treated early. The risk
associated with the test was accepted as being minimal to nil and the parent‘s
objections were accepted as being irrational in the non-pejorative sense. The
High Court had refused the application of the health board to obtain an order
permitting them to carry out the test.

Arguments that the Constitution might support a pro-child approach often draw
on the dissent of Keane CJ in that case. The then Chief Justice cited PW v AW
with seeming approval and was satisfied that Ellis J‘s application of the welfare
principle was of general application and therefore was not limited to custody
disputes114. Despite this, he felt that the constitutional presumption outlined by
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Finlay CJ in Re JH115 was limited to custody cases and therefore was not
applicable in HW and CW116.

It is curious that Keane CJ felt that Ellis J‘s statement of the law was of general
application while Finlay CJ‘s statement in Re JH117 was not, despite the fact that
both cases were custody disputes. This is especially questionable since the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 (at issue in Re JH118) is explicitly stated to be
of general application. Nevertheless, there is at least a strong argument that
Finlay CJ‘s statement in Re JH119 only applies in cases where Article 42.5 is
being used to completely replace the parents and that it is not relevant to a case
such as HW and CW120. Having set out this base, the Chief Justice went on to
outline the basis of children‘s rights under Article 40.3 and felt that there was an
inherent jurisdiction in the courts to vindicate those rights121.

However this was where the rest of the Supreme Court disagreed and case was
effectively decided on jurisdiction and on the doctrine of the separation of
powers to a certain extent. Denham J argued that the effect of Article 40.3 was
not to create a roving jurisdiction. Rather, it existed to guarantee that the state
vindicate those rights through its laws and as far as practicable. She felt that
―the State has not chosen to use its laws – by enacting legislation –to protect Paul
in the manner envisaged by Article 40.3.2‖122. Absent any jurisdiction under
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Article 40.3, the appellants could only be successful under Article 42.5 and
Denham J felt this was not an ―exceptional case‖.123

Furthermore, she argued that the state was the default parent, not the super
parent124. The learned judge felt that to order the test to be taken would be to
effectively make the test compulsory and that the court ―…without the benefit of
the kind of analysis and preliminary work which would precede legislation,
would be making a policy decision for all children that this test be
compulsory.‖125As such, Denham J hinted at a potential infringement of the
separation of powers, even if it was not explicitly stated.

Murphy J agreed that this case did not fall into the exceptional category126, and
although he was frustrated with the attitude of the parents, he felt compelled to
apply the law as it was127. Murray J (as he then was) also concurred, feeling
that to come to any other decision would be to engage the courts ―in a sort of
micro-management of the family.‖128

Mr Justice Hardiman also argued that the appellants‘ case was inhibited, inter
alia, by jurisdiction problems. He confirmed the previous statements that Article
40.3 guarantees that the state will vindicate personal rights through its laws129
and stated: ―there is no legislation on this topic, other than that referred to above
[the Health Act, 1954] whose effect is to enshrine voluntarism and parental
123
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responsibility.‖130 Like Denham J, he concludes that state intervention could
therefore only be by way of Article 42.5.

However, he further argued that Article 42.5 could not be used in the way the
applicants intended and would not be applicable in this case since that Article
was only intended to be used to fully replace the family, not to momentarily
allow the state to take its place. He stated: ―I do not accept that the authority of
the family or role of the parents is capable of subdivision in this fashion.‖131 He
also mentioned the potential influence of the doctrine of separation of powers132.

It is submitted that the case was correctly decided. It seems evident that Article
40.3 only pledges the state to intervene through its laws. In cases, such as the
present one, where the legislative and executive branches have not enacted laws,
the courts cannot assume that it is within their power to vindicate rights. Such an
approach could lead to a potentially limitless expansion of judicial jurisdiction in
all areas of personal rights. While one might argue that the legislature would be
prevented from making such procedures compulsory by the constitutional
protections of the family, this is not a justification for massively increasing the
ability of the courts to enforce personal rights.

Moreover, the factual consequences of the judgment are not as egregious as are
sometimes presented. As Denham J argued, the argument that the child‘s rights
were being seriously infringed is at least questionable: ―There was no particular
reason why this child should be tested for PKU. There was no relevant family
130
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history. There were no circumstances which made it particularly apt for the child
to have the test. The only form of the test offered was by way of taking blood
from the heel of the child by way of a heel prick.‖133 Nevertheless, the result
highlights how invisible children‘s rights can be under the current constitutional
order, even when the case solely concerns children‘s rights.

Confirmation of the Parent-Centred Approach – Baby Ann Decision

Any belief that the Supreme Court might adopt a more child-centred approach
was surely ended by the recent Baby Ann134 decision. The case concerned an
adoption dispute with facts virtually identical to Re JH135. In the High Court,
McMenamin J granted custody of the child to the adoptive parents who had been
in custody of the child for most of its life (the child was 2 years old at the time of
the Supreme Court proceedings). However the Supreme Court unanimously
overturned the High Court‘s decision and awarded custody to the natural parents
who had married since putting the child up for adoption.

Hardiman J admitted that the appearance of the constitutional family in the case
significantly altered the legal context136. Consequently, he reiterated the law as
laid down in Re JH137 and concluded that there was a constitutional presumption
that the child‘s welfare was best preserved in the family138. Despite her personal
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reluctance139 to award custody to the natural parents, McGuinness J felt that Re
JH test had to be employed140. All the Supreme Court justices held that the case
did not warrant the state taking the place of the natural parents either according
to Article 42.5 or the ―compelling reasons test‖. Essentially, the court could not
find any physical failure on the part of the parents.

The Consequences of the Constitutional Status Quo

The Supreme Court decision in Baby Ann141 confirms the pro-parent approach. It
highlights a presumption, at least in custody disputes relating to marital children,
that the child‘s welfare is best secured in the marital family. This iron-cast
presumption would only be rebutted in the exceptional situations detailed in Re
JH142. Outside these exceptional situations, the courts would be restrained from
basing their decision on any other consideration than the sanctity of the
constitutional marriage. As Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O‘Mahony put it:
―The striking feature of this case was not just its outcome, but rather the fact that
the terms of reference available to the court to make its decision did not include
what was in the interests of Baby Ann or what would best protect or promote her
rights.‖143

Therefore, adoption proceedings, where the subject is the child, may proceed
without any consideration of the child‘s well being at least in terms of the
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ultimate decision. This may result in the courts making decisions that are
manifestly to the child‘s disadvantage. In Baby Ann144, the psychological damage
the child could suffer was held to be a legally subsidiary issue in the context of
the marital family.

Outside cases such as custody disputes – where the courts are implicitly expected
to consider children‘s rights – the constitutional protection of children is stunted
by justiciability issues. The courts are not endowed with a jurisdiction to ensure
constitutional rights are upheld. Rather, they have interpreted that the state only
guarantees to vindicate constitutional rights through its laws and the courts have
no role in making such laws. Furthermore, per Finlay CJ in Re Article 26 and the
Adoption (No 2) Bill 1987145, the rights of children pursuant to Article 40.3 must
be read in conjunction with Article 42.5. Essentially, any personal rights vested
in the child can only be vindicated with due regard for the child‘s natural and
imprescriptible ‗right‘ to belong to a constitutional family.

Therefore, the rights afforded to children are often of little use, since children
lack the legal ability to enforce their rights, and the state is often unable to
displace the parent‘s authority. Therefore, while the Constitution guarantees
children rights, in many cases it will offer no effective mechanism to enforce
them. The state may, by legislation, provide for their enforcement but such
legislation will inevitably run the risk of being repugnant to the constitution‘s
protection of the marital family and therefore be useless.
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Section D – Conclusion

In the grand constitutional scheme, children are effectively relegated to a sort of
second class citizen. The primary legal consideration is the balance between the
state and the family. Child protections are limited by the dual barriers of a
constitutional presumption that the child‘s welfare is best secured in the family
and a constitutional limitation that means that children‘s rights will often not be
enforced.

Children‘s rights, whether they exist or not, are ultimately of little legal concern
in many cases. Ryan argues that the caselaw has produced ―a legal framework
that in its most fundamental form views children simply as an adjunct of the
family, the object of an ideological struggle between the family, on the one hand,
and the State on the other.‖146 As Shannon argues, ―It is only with difficulty that
the law has advanced from its position as regarding children as possessions.‖147 It
would seem ludicrous that cases concerning the welfare of children should have
the balance between family and state as their primary concern and the interests of
the child are at the same time relegated to a secondary importance. Surely the
correct constitutional approach should not be about balancing state and family
rights, but about protecting children.
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CHAPTER TWO – CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES

A. Introduction

The conclusions reached in chapter one were that the constitutional status quo
represents a correct interpretation of the law – at least in the technical sense –
and that the superior courts are not going to advocate a more child-centred
approach, at least until there is some substantial change in its composition. While
the former conclusion might be challenged, one could not reasonably argue with
the latter. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court was to take on a more activist
and socially liberal form, it would still be required to overrule or disregard
decades of Supreme Court authority if it was to advocate a more child-centred
approach. Therefore, even a more liberal Supreme Court would be unlikely to
adopt child-centred jurisprudence.

Given this reality, the discussion must now turn to the Constitution itself and
framing and philosophical inspirations. It must be considered why the
Constitution was framed in the way that it was and what principles lie behind it.
Furthermore, it must be questioned whether these principles are compatible with
and appropriate in modern Irish society and if the Constitution is framed in a way
that will allow it to act for a developing liberal democracy. The controversy
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surrounding recent decisions1 and the numerous calls from academia2, political
actors3, and members of the judiciary4 would suggest that the Constitution is not
wholly appropriate to deal with child protection in the modern age. Therefore,
the question is: whether the Constitution should be changed and, if it should, how
it should be amended and according to what principles?

This chapter will begin by examining the context and circumstances surrounding
the framing of the relevant provisions in the Constitution in 1937 and the
inspirations behind them. It will then address the impact of societal change on the
provisions and their underlying principles. It will be argued that certain
constitutional provisions and their underlying philosophies are inappropriate in
the context of modern society. The aim is to show that any improvement in child
protection will require complete reform of the constitutional provisions on the
family as a whole. It will be proposed that liberal and secular principles would
offer a more appropriate base for constitutional provisions on the child and
family, and one more capable of generating a Constitution that is effective in
modern society and in the future.
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It is important to illustrate that, while focus should be limited to child protection,
such a chapter will inevitably be forced to consider wider constitutional themes
and issues. However, these themes cannot be considered in great detail and will
only be dealt with in as much as is necessary to address the central issue of
children‘s rights.

B. Framing and Underlying Principles

Introduction

An analysis of the framing of the Constitution and the underlying principles
involved is a necessary precursor to considering any change in the philosophy
behind constitutional provisions.

As will be seen, the family and education provisions of the Constitution are
heavily influenced by the principles of natural law. Since natural law will be
dealt with in a more detailed way later on in the chapter, it should suffice for this
section to consider natural law as consistent with a general Christian philosophy,
and that its invocation signifies the influence of Christian ideology. As Hogan
and Whyte observe, ―the reference to the nature of the state as ‗Christian and
democratic‘ [in Ryan v Attorney General5] unmistakeably suggests a ‗higher law‘
approach.‖6 Furthermore, the invocation of natural law in the courts has
generally produced rationes decidendi that are at least consistent with Christian
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teaching7. It should be no surprise that, in this jurisdiction, natural law has
manifested itself in a way that is particularly consistent with Catholic teaching8.
This is evidenced by the fact that the Church of Ireland has recommended the
removal of natural law references from the provisions on the family and
described them as ―unhelpful and outdated in today‘s constitutional context.‖9

The arguments of Mr Justice Hardiman10 and of the respondents in North
Western Health Board v HW and CW11 provide an illustration of why a historical
examination is necessary. Hardiman J agreed with the respondents‘ proposition
that the general perception that Articles 41 and 42 were grounded in papal
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encyclicals and catholic teaching is questionable12. It was argued that the Articles
could have been based on alternative inspirations13. This section will illustrate
that such opinions are at variance with the vast majority of academic and judicial
opinion and most of the historical evidence and that they misrepresent the
philosophical origin of the Articles.

The Framing of the Constitution

The framing process of Bunreacht na hÉireann was famously clandestine14 but it
is widely accepted that the document was largely the creation of President de
Valera and his small group of chosen civil servants. While we know relatively
little about the process we can be confident that ―… it [the Constitution] was
clearly very much Mr de Valera‘s own creation…‖15 However, de Valera himself
was certainly in substantial consultation with members of the clergy16 during the
drafting process. In particular John Charles McQuaid was in constant contact and
has been described as ―…the single most important clerical influence on De
Valera.‖17
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It has been argued, however, that individuals such as McQuaid were not as
influential as they are often made out to be. McDonagh18 questions the influence
of John Charles McQuaid and argues that the draft was largely De Valera‘s work.
He cites an interview in which he ―…took De Valera to suggest…‖ that
McQuaid‘s influence was limited to Article 45.19 It has also been proposed,
naturally, that the President was primarily motivated by an intention to avoid the
wrath of the Church and to produce a Constitution that would stand up to
ratification20. However de Valera was a devout Catholic, if not an especially
conservative one, and John Charles McQuaid was a close family and personal
friend21. The President‘s substantial correspondence with McQuaid and other
members of the clergy would seem to have been motivated by more than mere
political expediency.

Political Debate on the Constitution

There was unusually little debate on the family provisions of the Constitution.
Keogh notes that Fine Gael did not seriously challenge Articles 40 to 45 and
were chiefly concerned with the presidential powers given the contemporary
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political climate in Europe.22 When the Articles were discussed, children‘s
interests were ignored and there was more concern about women‘s rights and
about the impact on north-south relations23. Whyte argues that there would not
have been much of a debate in any event. ―There was [in 1923-1937]
overwhelming agreement that traditional Catholic values should be maintained...
There is no evidence that pressure from the hierarchy [on the politicians] was
needed to bring this about: it appears to have been spontaneous. The two major
parties… were at one on this.‖24

Academic Opinion

The academic literature is largely in agreement that Articles 41 and 42 were
heavily influenced by Catholic teaching. Garret Fitzgerald notes that the relevant
ideology was ―…a particular form of Catholic teaching prevalent in the 1930‘s.‖
He further argues: ―over and above this [the divorce prohibition, special position
of the church etc]… [catholic teaching] is visible in tenor and tone of the
preamble and of the formulation of fundamental rights in relation to the Family,
Private Property and Education[emphasis added]‖ .25 Fuller argues similarly: ―It
is in Articles 41 to 44 that the constitution of 1937 becomes particularly Catholic
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its thrust.‖26 The conclusions of Hogan27, Beytagh28, Walsh29, Browne30 and
Hogan & Whyte31, amongst others, are further evidence of this consensus.

Judicial Interpretation

Judicial opinion reflects the academic position. In Re Tilson32 it was stated in the
High Court that ―Our fundamental law deliberately establishes a Christian
Constitution‖33. Similarly, Gavan Duffy J stated in Heffernan v Heffernan 34 that
Articles 41 and 42 were ―…redolent… of the great papal encyclicals in pare
materia…‖ In North Western Health Board v HW & CW35, Murphy J opined that
parents were conferred a special autonomy by the Thomistic philosophy, ―the
influence of which on the Constitution has been so frequently recognised in the
judgments and writings of Mr Justice Walsh.‖36 These statements are not in
isolation. The recognition of the Constitution as a Christian document has been a
consistent and dominant theme in Irish constitutional law37.
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The constitutional Articles on the family have also been particularly influential in
their support of a natural rights theory in the Constitution. As Beytagh observes,
Article 41.1.1, ―…more so than any other provision of the Constitution, provides
textual support to the Irish judiciary‘s view that a natural rights jurisprudence
was intended along with the specific protections outlined in the document…‖38

Religious Inspirations

The influence of papal encyclicals on the Constitution has also been widely
observed. Quadragesimo Anno in particular, is often cited as here for example:
―The dominant social thinking of the time, pre-eminently as expressed in the
papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno… favoured ‗subsidiarity‘ – that the state
should offer support or help smaller groups, including the family, but should not
supplant them.‖39 Published just a few years before the drafting of the
Constitution, Whyte saw the encyclical as inspiring a re-assertion of the
previously dormant Catholic social movement, ―It would restore the state… to its
rightful place, which is not to do anything itself, but to direct, watch, urge and
restrain subsidiary organisations…‖40

While Quadragesimo Anno seems to have been influential, the encyclical Divini
Illius Magistri41 seems to reflect the constitutional provisions of the family more
obviously. Certain sections of the encyclical are notable in their similarity to the
38
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provisions of the Irish Constitution. At paragraph 32 it is stated that the family
has ―a right inalienable because inseparably joined to the strict obligation, a right
anterior to any right whatever of civil society and of the State, and therefore
inviolable on the part of any power on earth.‖ Furthermore, at paragraph 33: ―it
would be contrary to natural justice if the child, before the use of reason, were
removed from the care of its parents, or if any disposition were made concerning
him against the will of the parents.‖ These statements bear more than a passing
resemblance to Article 41 provisions. Paragraph 45 of the encyclical is
remarkably similar to Article 42.5 of the Constitution: ―It also belongs to the
State to protect the rights of the child itself when the parents are found wanting
either physically or morally in this respect, whether by default, incapacity or
misconduct.‖

Conclusion

The Roman Catholic elements of the constitution are obvious in the explicit
provisions and in many of the seminal judgments handed down since 1937. This
influence has, perhaps, been most noticeable in the area of family law and child
protection. The presence and judicial invocation of a natural law element to the
Constitution has further bolstered the Roman Catholic slant to the Constitution.

However, the confessional influence is more nuanced than a simple reading of
the Constitution and constitutional caselaw would suggest. It has been amplified
by the heavy Christian orientation and substantial Catholic Church control of
education and healthcare organisations. Indeed, as Kelly argued, ―…there is
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equally no doubt that their [Articles 41 and 42] effectiveness owes something
also to the Christian educational background and instinctively Christian
disposition of the judges.‖42

Therefore, families who could not be interfered with by the State, took their
guidance from the Catholic Church. Consequently, the primacy of the family is
intrinsically tied to the education provisions – this may be why they are linked in
the Constitution – the ultimate aim of which is to ensure that the children of the
nation were indoctrinated, through their education, as Catholics. Noel Browne,
perhaps overstating the point, described the situation thusly: ―Inevitably, then,
our teachers, historians, politicians, and journalists, our Cabinets, the electorate
and, as a consequence, all our laws, have reflected fundamentalist, antiRepublican, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, and reactionary attitudes fed to us by
Rome‖43.

It should, of course, be noted that the effect of the provisions was not solely to
endow the Catholic Church with influence. The Catholic Church, and indeed
other churches and religious organisations and obviously parents could benefit
from the substantial deference given to families and the limitations on the state.
This does not affect the central point however, namely that the constitutional
provisions on the family were largely drafted to avail the Catholic Church and to
forward Christian values.
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C. Societal Change in Ireland

Introduction

It has been shown that the Constitution, and the family and education provisions
in particular, was heavily influenced by Catholic teaching. Moreover, this
Catholic teaching was of the more conservative variety, generated by the siege
mentality evoked by the fear of communism and the general will to set the nation
apart from Britain and its perceived ‗immoral‘ influences. In this sense, certain
aspects of 1930s Catholicism represented an exercise in nation building. This
Constitution may have represented a legitimate base for Irish society in the
1930‘s, however, Irish society changed noticeably in the subsequent 70 years.
Despite the fact that the idea that there has been a substantial change in Irish
society is widely accepted, and that this paper is a constitutional law thesis and
not a sociological one, it is necessary for the purposes of clarity and completion,
to examine this change to some degree.

Early Change and Change in the Roman Catholic Church

This social change, despite a common perception, was not limited to the 1990s
and the beginning of the 21st century. Ireland also experienced considerable, if
not groundbreaking, changes between 1950 and 1989. The proliferation of the
media challenged the monopoly on moral formulation, previously held by the
Church hierarchy in Ireland. Television, in particular, had a profoundly
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liberalising effect. The arrival of television also heralded the end of the age of
censorship, if not initially then at least in the long term.44

In every decade between 1920 and 1960 there was a substantial level of
emigration. While this was to fluctuate during the 1960s and 1970s, it would
resume in the 1980s45. This phenomenon exposed Irish men and women to
cultural and social mores that were completely different to the Ireland they left.
The employment opportunities of the British war economy exposed many Irish
Catholics to the post-war liberalisation that their native land largely skipped.
Obviously this effect was primarily experienced by the migrants who were no
longer part of Irish society, at least in the short term, however the experience
represented a further dilution of the isolationism. This is illustrated by the fact
that Bishops in the 1950s lamented the ―leakage of faith‖ caused my migration46.
Rural migration to Dublin also had a similar effect. Rural conservative attitudes
were diluted with the more pluralist attitudes of the city47.

However this change was not restricted to the public at large. As Fuller notes,
even in the 1950s, members of the Roman Catholic clergy were beginning to
think that change in doctrine was needed48 and this change was eventually
manifested at a papal level with the advent of Pope John XXIII49. Pope John
XXIII‘s 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra is highlighted as signalling a shift in
44
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policy from restricting the state to emphasising social justice. ―Whereas previous
popes had railed against state intervention in the economy and any development
that smacked of a welfare state system, John XIII laid much more emphasis on
the practical need for public authority ‗to intervene to remedy the lack of balance
[in economies, parts of countries and even peoples of the of the world]‖.50
Consequently, it might reasonably be argued that the current Constitutional
provisions on the family are at variance even with modern Church thinking.

This change in Roman Catholic Church thinking has arguably been mirrored
politically. The decline in the influence of mediating structures in society – such
as the extended family, the community and churches – has corresponded with an
increase in the importance of the state51. This experience is indicative of a
general phenomenon in western society as recognised by Edward Shorter52. This
steady increase in the State‘s ‗parenting‘53 role is also noticeable in the area of
education. Most notably, it can be seen in the extension of free secondary
education in the 1960s and of free third level education in the 1990s.

Modern Society
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Therefore, even before the era of the ‗Celtic Tiger‘, Irish society had changed
substantially. So much so, that Keogh observed: ―By 1987, the Ireland of the
‗age of de Valera‘ was little more than a yellowed photograph to the country with
the youngest population in Europe. In the year of Bono, the Constitution appears
dated, with provisions at variance with values held in sections of the
community‖54. The societal change since 1990 has been so conspicuous and
widely observed, it hardly needs commenting on. A brief summary should
suffice.

The general profile of the Irish family is now far more diverse and varied55. The
economic structure of the country has also shifted since 1990 and seriously since
1937. From an economy dominated by agriculture in 1937, the vast majority of
the population now work in industry or services with only 6% involved in
agriculture56. While identification with the Catholic religion has remained high57,
mass attendance has been dropping precipitously since 1990, with studies
reporting that attendance dropped from 85% in 1990 to 66% in 199658 and to
48% in 200659. The substantial increase in inward migration60 has also
diversified Irish society and promises to continue to do so61. While immigration
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does not in itself necessarily produce a more liberal society – although it might –
it most likely increases the diversity of the host population. Consequently,
immigration might magnify the need for a more secular Constitution62.

International Obligations

Ireland‘s ability to isolate itself morally and socially has also diminished since
1937. Most obviously, this is because of the range of international obligations the
state has undertaken and had imposed. Beytagh has suggested that a number of
the fundamental constitutional rights appear in serious need of re-writing in light
of societal change and EU and international human rights law63. Specifically, it is
widely believed that Ireland is failing in its international obligations in the area
of child protection64. Indeed, Shannon argues that ratifying such international
agreements, without any intention to live up to them, may do children more harm
than good by raising false expectations of progression in the wider public65.

Conclusion
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We have seen above how the Constitution and the family provisions in particular
were especially influenced by Catholic teaching in the 1930s. It is widely
accepted that Irish society has changed substantially since that decade and it is
arguable that ―nowhere have the changes been more striking than in family
life.‖66 As the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution concluded,
―Public opinion moved [between 1937 and 2006] in a more liberal direction,
reflecting the growing liberalism of ordinary Catholics whose behaviour drifted
steadily away from strict observance of Catholic tenets‖67.

D. Natural Law

Introduction

‗Natural law‘ is a broad theory or combination of theories which propose that
there is ―a natural law of divine origin [which] is above human law, however
positively expressed‖.68 Debate over the legitimacy, applicability and consistency
of the theory has raged for centuries and one could not attempt to exhaustively
deal with the subject in this context. Nevertheless, the theory must be assessed
insofar as it informs a constitutional stance on the balance between parent, child
and state. A discussion of natural law is further warranted by the fact that the
doctrine is, arguably, implicitly invoked in the wording of Articles 41 and 42.
Three of the five constitutional references to ―nature‖ or ―natural‖ are in Articles
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41 and 42. This section will assess the value of a natural law base to
constitutional provisions on the family in modern society.

It should be of little surprise therefore that the concept of natural rights has been
influential in the context of child protection69. As Martin notes, the interpretation
of natural and imprescriptible rights has helped to ―tilt the legal balance in favour
of the autonomy of the family unit to the possible detriment of individual
members.‖70

However, the legitimacy of the theory is questionable and it might be challenged
as a unsuitable base for a Constitution in a modern liberal democracy. This is
especially so in light of the changes in Irish society since 1937. Jeremy Bentham
famously described the theory as ―nonsense on stilts‖71. HLA Hart summed up
Bentham‘s position, ―Bentham both despised it [the concept of natural rights] as
intellectually disreputable and feared when it was used in political controversy or
embodied in public documents, regarding it as a threat to all government and to
the stability of society.‖72 As will be seen, the theory can be challenged on a
number of grounds.

Vagueness
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In making a half-hearted attempt to define natural law, Ronald Dworkin offered
the following: ―though the various theories grouped under that title are
remarkably different from one another, and the name suits none of them‖73. This
quote illustrates a central limitation of natural law; it is often entirely unclear
exactly what the natural law commands and its proponents rarely specify what
school of natural law they refer to. This experience has been repeated in Ireland
and the Constitutional Review Group concluded that ―no clear meaning of these
terms [the references to natural law in Articles 41 and 42] has emerged from the
judicial consideration of them‖74. While highlighting the lack of precision
redolent in superior court judges‘ usage of the theory75, Clarke nevertheless,
proceeds to assume what theory superior court judges are referring to and he
summarises it as ―…a hybrid scholastic theory, partly derived from Aquinas and
partly inherited from later scholastics through the intermediary of early twentieth
century Catholic theology.‖76

However even this assumed theory would not be satisfying. For a start, the
teachings of thinkers like Aquinas are hopelessly outdated. His beliefs in slavery
as natural and the subjugation of women could not be accepted in modern
society77. Absent this base, natural law, in the Irish context, arguably amounts to
nothing more the imposition of modern Church thinking. It should not be a
surprise then that the application of the theory has resulted in judges delivering
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conflicting judgments in the same cases ostensibly based on the same natural
law78.

Subjectivity

The vagueness of the theory also diminishes the legitimacy of constitutional law
in that decisions can be seen as merely the result of the subjective opinions of
judges. Given that natural law can provide little specific guidance on important
issues, it is left to judges to construe what the natural law would say. As Hogan
comments: ―If the legitimacy of judicial review is to continue to be accepted,
decisions in major constitutional cases must be seen to represent more than the
personal opinions of individual judges.‖79 The Constitutional Review Group,
considering natural law as a source of rights in general, concluded: ―The overall
result is that reference to the principles of natural law, in the absence of a text
establishing its principles, lacks the objectivity and precision which might
reasonably be expected.‖80

Democratic Deficit
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Another objection is that if one accepts that the Constitution is infused with a
natural law theory, this would represent a highly undemocratic system of law
making. Laws and decisions are plucked, not from a law passed by the people or
its representatives, but from a vague and ill-defined theory based largely on
Christian teaching. Clarke argues that natural law has ―in principle, almost
unlimited scope for frustrating the ―democratically‖ enacted laws of the
Oireachtas.‖81 One would have to also question what authority has endowed
judges with the ability to interpret natural law.

While the references to natural law may be obvious to lawyers and legal
academics, it is not certain that average citizen (in either 1937 or 2008) would
appreciate the presence of this largely unseen influence. One would have to
seriously question – if it was widely appreciated that the Constitution was
influenced significantly by natural law – whether this situation would be
acceptable to the populace at large today; indeed, one would have to ask if the
people of 1937 would have accepted it82.

Conclusion

It could reasonably be argued that ‗natural law‘ merely represents a legal and
philosophical smokescreen to disguise permanent Catholic Church influence on
the laws of the state, an influence which, absent a referendum, the people are
81
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powerless to control. Even if this were to overstate the situation, there would still
be sufficient grounds to limit the continuing use of the theory in Irish
constitutional jurisprudence on the basis that it is, inter alia, too vague, too
subjective and too undemocratic. Indeed, Keane CJ seemed to doubt its
legitimacy in TD v Minister for Education83. It is submitted that Ireland should
adopt the Constitutional Review Group‘s recommendations84 and remove all
references to ‗natural law‘ (such as ‗natural‘ and ‗imprescriptible‘) from the
Constitutional provisions on the family. The presence and substantial influence
of natural law on the provisions of the constitution is another illustration of how
complete restructuring of the constitutional provisions on the family are needed.

E. Liberal and Secular Principles

Introduction

It has been illustrated then that the Constitution was drafted with a Christian
philosophy in mind. It has also been shown that there has been a substantial
change in Irish society, especially during the last 10 to 15 years. Subsequently, it
was argued that natural law theories have been hugely unhelpful in Irish
constitutional jurisprudence and that they are particularly inappropriate in the
context of the family in modern Irish society. Mr Justice Walsh argued that so
long as the constitution reflects the politics and social culture of the majority of
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the people, ―…it is difficult to justify claims that a drastic overhaul is needed.‖85
It is submitted that the time for a drastic overhaul of the constitutional provisions
on the family has now arrived. The numerous calls for change in the last 15
years86 lend support to this view. It will be argued that a liberal and secular
approach to constitutional framing would be more representative of modern Irish
society and would be more proficient at protecting children.

This is not to say – at least not at this stage – that a more interventionist model is
needed in the area of child protection. Rather, it will be argued that the guiding
philosophy of the Constitution should permit such an approach if it was
considered necessary by, and in the interests of, modern society87. While liberal
and secular principles would form the basis of the new model, the model might
well be child-centred or parent-centred, state-centred or family-centred,
interventionist or non-interventionist. All that is proposed at this stage is that the
constitutional provisions should not be governed by a somewhat anachronistic
Christian philosophy and further limited by an ill-defined and unspecified natural
law.

Liberal and Secular Principles

It is perhaps ironic that liberalism should be championed to provide a more child
centred constitutional order, given the fact that liberalism is broadly based on the
principle of limiting state interference. However, even John Stewart Mill –
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arguably the founding father of classical liberalism – recognised that, within
liberalism, the issue of child protection was an exception to the rule. Indeed, his
‗harm principle‘ obliged the state to protect children from injuries to themselves
and by others, potentially including their parents88. Obviously, it is not proposed
that classical liberalism should be the basis of the Irish Constitution, however
modern social liberalism theory might provide a more suitable approach than the
current one. A more secular approach might also avail the Constitution,
especially in its ability to promote a more flexible constitutional order, one that is
more suited to dealing with a multi-cultural and increasingly secular society.

Advantages of a Liberal and Secular Approach

The most obvious justification for adopting such an approach is that it conforms
to the mores of Irish society in the present day. It also might be argued that a
liberal and secular approach would be better able to adapt to societal changes in
the future, changes which seem likely in light of continued immigration89. The
shift in society from a more conservative, religious one in 1937 to a more liberal
and secular one today has been observed above. This analysis is surely
incontrovertible. The fact that some might argue90 that a change in the
constitutional order might damage society should be of little relevance. The
Constitution is intended to be a political document that reflects the will of the
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people. It is not designed to be a moral code set by the religious hierarchy, family
rights advocates and natural law proponents.

Moreover, in principle, it is undesirable to have a constitution that does not
reflect the will of the people. This undermines the legitimacy of the democracy
and the people‘s belief in it and in its judicial branch. If decisions are seen to be
drawn from natural law theories and a seemingly unalterable constitution, the
people may become politically apathetic and disillusioned and generally sceptical
about the administration of justice.

It might also be argued that a constitution should avoid religious language as a
rule. Gerard Whyte has advanced this argument91. While he believes that there is
nothing wrong with using religious language as a frame –such as in the preamble
– he thinks it is inappropriate to use it in provisions which will involve coercion.
The family provisions, for example, inevitably will. Firstly, Whyte argues that if
there is a secular argument for a constitutional provision, it makes sense that this
should be the only one used since a religious argument might antagonise other
religious groups and the non-religious92. Secondly, he argues that religious belief
should not be used to coerce conscientious beliefs because ―…the proper role for
religious beliefs in social and political discourse is prophetic, rather than
coercive.‖93
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See, Gerard Whyte, ‗Some Reflections on the Role of Religion in the Constitutional Order‘ in
Patrick Twomey and Jim Murphy, Ireland’s Evolving Constitution 1937 – 1997: Collected
Essays, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998.
92
Gerard Whyte, ‗Some Reflections on the Role of Religion in the Constitutional Order‘ in
Patrick Twomey and Jim Murphy, Ireland’s Evolving Constitution 1937 – 1997: Collected
Essays, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998 at p 58.
93
Ibid.
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F. Conclusion

This chapter has proposed that not only is there a need to change the Constitution
to properly defend the interests of the child, but it is also necessary to alter the
constitutional provisions on the family in general. This is not to say that the state
should be a more interventionist in its dealings with the family – the next chapter
will assess that issue. Rather, it is submitted that it should not be assumed that
the family is entitled to the constitutional protections it currently receives and
that such deference must be objectively justified.
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CHAPTER THREE – ALTERNATIVE
MODELS

Section A – Introduction

This chapter will analyse the academic literature on how a balance between state
and family, parent and child might best be struck. This is a substantial task as
there has been a long-running and largely inconclusive debate on this topic in
many jurisdictions. The aim is to draw principles and philosophies that could be
used to ground a new constitutional order in Ireland as regards the constitutional
provisions on the family. Some provisional points must first be addressed.

This chapter will not be limited to assessing Irish literature. Given that the
exercise will involve proposing a new constitutional model, foreign academic
and judicial opinion can be as influential as domestic points of view. Indeed, they
might be more valuable. This is because much of the debate in Ireland has
concerned whether the Constitution should be changed in this area, rather than
how it should be changed1. Nevertheless, the aim will be to concentrate on
literature from jurisdictions with similar legal contexts, namely common law
jurisdictions and constitutional democracies. Therefore, American academic
literature – emanating, as it does, from a constitutional democracy largely

1

See, for example, the submissions to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution,
Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.The submission process was largely
dominated by a debate between children‘s rights groups and religious, conservative and family
groups over whether Constitution should be changed or not.
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composed of common law jurisdictions – emerges as an especially valuable
source of ideas.

In addition to this, consideration of American literature has several other
advantages. Firstly, the United States Constitution is silent as to the issue of the
family and the child and, as a result, different models have been applied at a
federal and state level. Furthermore, this has been accompanied by a wealth of
empirical and other studies which has added a great deal to the academic
discourse.

Nonetheless, for obvious reasons, American studies cannot be entirely conclusive
and the value of the American literature will be in its philosophical persuasion.
This chapter will attempt to present these and other arguments, in the context of
Irish legal, political and constitutional norms.

This exercise should not be inhibited by the variety of applications that a
constitutional change will have nor should it be obfuscated by the plethora of
legislative labels and legal standards that exist2. It should be remembered that
constitutional change will affect, inter alia, adoption cases, so-called ‗upbringing
cases‘3 and welfare proceedings. The fact that some works concentrate on certain
types of case in particular is not important as there is a central philosophical
question to be addressed, namely; how should the balance between parent, state
and child be set?

2
3

For example, ‗abandonment‘ in Ireland or ‗neglect‘ in the United States.
Such as in the case of North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
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Section B – Domestic Proposals

Introduction

As already mentioned, the Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation in 19934
marked the beginning of a period which has seen a plethora of authoritative calls
for amendment of the family provisions of the Constitution. The task of
examining all the proposals would be too lengthy and in any event it would be
largely pointless in that they rarely differ greatly and most have fallen by the
political wayside. However two proposals in particular warrant detailed attention,
namely, the amendments proposed by the Constitutional Review Group in 19965
and the 2006 recommendations of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the
Constitution‘s tenth report on the family6 and the resulting Twenty-Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007.

The Constitutional Review Group

In the context of the time in which it was published7, the 1996 Constitutional
Review Group‘s proposals were especially innovative. Firstly, as noted in
chapter two, the Review Group advised the removal of references to natural law
in the family provisions8. Secondly – in light of a fear that the Constitution

4

Kilkenny Incest Investigation: Report Presented to Mr Brendan Howlin TD, Minister for Health
by South Easter Health Board, The Stationary Office, Dublin, May 1993.
5
Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996.
6
All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary
Office, Dublin, 2006.
7
The Report of the Kilkenny Incest Inquiry notwithstanding, this was before there had been any
widespread calls for or campaign to amend the family provisions of the Constitution.
8
Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 336.
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stressed too greatly the rights of the family unit, to the detriment of its individual
members – the Review Group also called for the unenumerated rights of the child
to be expressly enumerated in Article 419. Their proposals were especially
progressive in this area as they included a recommendation that a provision be
added to require the state to intervene to protect certain rights of the child.10 It
was also proposed that the Constitution should be brought more into line with the
European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child11. The Review Group also proposed adoption of the best
interests standard as a constitutional norm12.

These proposals represented a novel and progressive revaluation of the
constitutional provisions on the family. The value of removing the natural law
references has already been commented on and the advantages of providing a
positive obligation on the state to vindicate expressly provided children‘s rights
will be highlighted in the next chapter. The introduction of a best interests
standard at a constitutional level might also be seen as a progressive development
although, as will be seen, the standard has certain potentially crucial weaknesses.
While the proposals of the Constitutional Review Group were effectively ignored
at a political level and remain unimplemented, the report continues to be referred
9

Ibid.
Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 330: ―If a
decision is made to amend Article 41 so as to grant express rights to children and also maintain
an express guarantee of parents‘ rights and duties, it would appear necessary to expand the
circumstances referred to in Article 42.5 so as to include a situation where the protection of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of children require intervention. A re-wording of the State‘s
duty to the child under this Article is necessary in the light of the Review Group‘s proposed
amendments to guarantee expressly certain rights of the child and elsewhere remove adjectives
and phrases which appear to refer to natural law which have been a source of some difficulties‖
11
Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 328-329.
12
Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 337: ―The
Review Group considers that, notwithstanding the above legislative provisions [and Re JH], it is
desirable to put into the Constitution an express obligation to treat the best interests of the child
as a paramount consideration in any actions relating to children.‖
10
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to as an authoritative source. However, arguably, the Report of the All Party
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the resulting Twenty-Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007 have effectively overruled the Review
Group‘s findings.

The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution

The tenth report of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution on
the subject of the family13 represented the first attempt, at a legislative level, to
reform the constitutional provisions on the family. Unfortunately however, the
report offered little to improve family law provisions to protect children. This is
not surprising. The Committee spent most of its time examining submissions
from a range of interest groups, most of which opposed any amendment
whatsoever14.

Such an investigation will inevitably be dominated by unsophisticated polemics
and is likely to result in a compromise proposal that attempts to please all sides.
An illustration of the limits of such an approach is the inclusion, in the final
report, of a substantial quote from the Irish Catholics Bishops Conference15. The
quote invokes the judgment of Ellis J in PW v AW16 to illustrate that the
Constitution need not be amended. The use of this highly questionable authority

13

All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary
Office, Dublin, 2006.
14
All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary
Office, Dublin, 2006 at p 17. It is regrettable that the new Joint Committee on the Constitutional
Amendment on Children has also adopted this approach.
15
Ibid at pp 90-92.
16
PW v AW (Unreported, High Court, 21 April 1980).
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in the final report of the Committee illustrates the limitations of a process that
gives centre stage, and most of its consideration, to interest groups.

Furthermore, unlike the 1996 Constitutional Review Group that was composed
mostly of jurists, civil servants and academics, the 2006 Group was a
parliamentary committee composed of politicians from various political
backgrounds17. Moreover, the Committee reported just months before the 2007
general election. The influence of political agendas and election concerns was
always likely to be an obstacle to the Committee proposing any innovative
reforms. Regardless of the cause, the Report provided little of note.

The following was the Committee‘s conclusion on child protection: ―A new
section should be inserted in Article 41 dealing with the rights of children as
follows: All children, irrespective of birth, gender, race or religion, are equal
before the law. In all cases where the welfare of the child so requires, regard
shall be had to the best interests of that child.‖18 This is a hopelessly limited
proposal. It promises only that regard will be given to the interests of the child.
This guarantee is so weak that it would be very unlikely to play any substantial
role in court proceedings. This is all the more true given that the Committee
recommended the retention of the protections of marital parents and of the
family19.

Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007
17

Again, regrettably, the new Joint Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children is
no different.
18
All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary
Office, Dublin, 2006 at p 124.
19
Ibid at p 123.
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The Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 roughly followed
on the recommendations of the Committee. The 2007 Bill was also limited in
several respects. It retained references to natural law; indeed, it added some new
ones20. The Article was to be inserted in Article 42 and therefore had no effect on
the rights conferred on parents in Articles 41 and 42. As such, the amendment
provisions are constantly overshadowed by the provisions on the family and are
probably subject to them. In any case, there were other limitations.

Kilkelly and O‘Mahony21 point out the potentially crucial effect of the use of the
phrase ―provision may be made by law‖ in four subsections22. They argue that
legislation enacted under these provisions would surely be subject to general
constitutional principles and rights23. This seems likely because, conversely, the
potential alternative applications of the provisions are unlikely. Kilkelly and
O‘Mahony point out that if the provisions are intended to render legislation
immune from constitutional challenge, this would surely have been explicitly
stated24. They suggest that any argument that the resulting legislation would form
part of the Constitution would render the legislation in contravention of Article
4625 in that it would amount to the legislature to amending the Constitution.

20

Articles 42A.1 and 42A.2 both refer to the ―natural and imprescriptible‖ rights of the child.
Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment:
Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19.
22
Namely, Article 42A.2, Article 42A.3, Article 42A.4 and Article 42A.5.1°
23
Including the various protections of the family. Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony,
The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19 at p
21.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
21
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Article 42A.1 proposed to acknowledge the natural and imprescriptible rights of
the child. Kilkelly and O‘Mahony pointed out that ―the provision almost
certainly refers to the same rights of the child that had been found in Article 42.5
in G v Bord Uchtála26, given the similarity of wording between this provision
and Article 42.5.‖27 Obviously this would add little to Constitutional
jurisprudence. It could also be argued that this provision would not change the
position in Re JH28 where the child was considered to have a natural and
imprescriptible right to be a member of the marital family. This could be seen as
a continuation of the jurisprudence highlighted by Duncan29, whereby parental
rights are disguised in the form of children‘s rights.

Article 42A.2.1° does little to improve things; in fact, it could be argued that it
makes matters worse for non-marital children. The Article retains the narrow
state intervention standard of Article 42.5. However, as it is not limited to the
context of the marital family, the provision draws non-marital children under the
same schedule as marital children. Consequently, state intervention to protect
non-marital children – who had been previously unaffected by the narrow limits
of state intervention in the marital family – is effectively limited by Article 42.5.
Eoin Carolan calls this a ―…classic case of levelling-down, rather than levellingup.‖30

26

G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment:
Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19 at p 22.
28
Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
29
WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ.
30
Eoin Carolan, The Constitutional Consequences of Reform: Best Interests after the Amendment,
(2007) 10(3) IJFL 9 at p 14.
27
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While Article 42A.4 makes provision to allow the best interests of the child to be
a consideration in court proceedings concerning adoption, guardianship, custody
or access, it only allowed provision to be made for this by law. In any event, the
wording in the provision is weaker than in the similar provision in the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964. The state is only entitled to legislate to
provide that a court will endeavour to secure to secure the best interests of the
child. It is notable that the list of proceedings to which the standard applies is
exhaustive and as such education and healthcare proceedings would not consider
the best interests of the child in any way.

All told, the Bill represents a mish-mash of policies, espousing none in
particular. As Carolan has argued: ―[the Bill] does not evince a consistent policy
on the family. It strives to be all things to all people, affirming and supporting the
discrete rights and interests of children, parents and the family unit.‖31 Carolan
goes on to point out that the problems that have arisen in this area have not been
due to a failure to recognise the rights of the child, but due to the weakness of
those rights in comparison with other interests. The Bill does not redress this
imbalance in any substantial way.

Section C – The Best Interests Standard

Introduction

31

Eoin Carolan, The Constitutional Consequences of Reform: Best Interests after the Amendment,
(2007) 10(3) IJFL 9 at p 15.
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The Constitutional Review Group32, the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the
Constitution33 and the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill, 2007
all made reference to the best interests standard34. The standard is consistently
advocated by children‘s rights groups and family law specialists35 and is used in
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Therefore,
it is distinctly possible that the concept might form the basis of a future
amendment. However the best interest‘s standard is not universally accepted in
the international literature. This section will assess the academic criticism and
evaluate the potential benefits of the best interests standard.

Indeterminacy

In the first place, it is argued that the best interests of the child cannot always, or
even regularly, be determined. The argument goes that the courts and expert
professionals are simply unable to make accurate predictions about how their
decision will affect the child or what the child would want. This is in part
because of the obvious difficulties in making predictions of the future. It is also
caused by the limitations in our ability to measure the psychological implications
of particular decisions. John Elster argues that the best interests standard simply
doesn‘t produce results in many cases.36

32

Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996.
All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary
Office, Dublin, 2006.
34
The ‗best interests‘ standard generally holds that the best interests of the child will be the or a
paramount consideration in legal proceedings concerning children.
35
See for example Geoffrey Shannon, Child Law, Thompson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005 at 45.
36
Elster, Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, University of Chicago Law
Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at p 11.
33
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Subjectivity

A logical corollary of the argument that the standard is indeterminate is the
contention that that it is also subjective. While highlighting the advantages of the
standard, James G. Dwyer accepted that judges could use the theory to impose
their own subjective viewpoints37. Bartlett went further: ―…the best interests of
the child is a highly contingent social construction. Although we often pretend
otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments about what is best for children are…
the result of political and social judgments about what kind of society we
prefer‖.38 It is not difficult for Irish observers to envision an example of how the
best interests standard can represent different things to different people. The
current interpretation of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 in light of the
constitutional preference for the family represents just such an example39.

Maintenance of the Rhetoric of Rights

Many commentators40 have been critical of a so-called rhetoric of rights in the
area of children‘s rights where the rights of individual parties are given undue
concern at the expense of more holistic concerns. This concept will be examined
in greater detail later in the chapter. For now, it should suffice to say that it is
alleged that the best interests standard bolsters this flaw by attempting to give
primacy to rights of the child at the expense of the rights of others.
37

James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note,
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053.
38
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, Yale Law Journal, 1988, 98 Yale L.J. 293 at
p 303.
39
For example in the cases of Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375 and in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374.
40
For example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, Yale Law Journal, 1988, 98
Yale L.J. 293.
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John Elster argues that it is unjust in this respect in that it fails to adequately
protect parents‘ rights41. Over-concentration on the ‗best interests‘ of the child
can prejudice parents who may have put in a great deal of commitment and effort
into their parenting. Elster accepts that the child needs protection but qualifies it
thusly: ―That protection should not, however, extend to small gains in the child's
welfare achieved at the expense of large losses in parental welfare‖42 He also
warns against making decisions on purely utilitarian bases.

Self-Defeating Standard

Elster argues that the standard would be self-defeating in that it would damage
the relationships between children and parents. His argument is as follows: ―the
best interests principle would create so much uncertainty among parents, with
subsequent lack of emotional attachment to their children that the net effect
would be to harm children in general. In addition there would be a strong
disincentive to having children at all.‖43 He also argues that the standard would
damage children by protracting and proliferating litigation, firstly, because the
standard would be uncertain and, secondly, because courts would need more time
to assess the more complicated best interests standard.44

The first contention is admittedly somewhat stretched in that it is unlikely that
the vast majority of families would consider it a possibility that the state would
41

Elster, Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, University of Chicago Law
Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at p 17.
42
Ibid at p 20.
43
Ibid at p 22.
44
Ibid at p 24.
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intervene in their family, regardless of the legal standard. If they did, one can
presume change in the law would be brought about. Nevertheless the standard
represents a lack of trust in families and is likely to be seen as depreciating the
role of families in general. From a parental perspective, it is anything but
reassuring. It also hints at a utilitarian approach which is likely to be unnerving
for many parents. The potential for increased and prolonged legal proceedings is
a reasonable practical concern and one worth bearing in mind in an appraisal of
the best interests standard.

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit also point out that the best interests standard
promotes excessive concern for the child‘s physical best interests45. This, they
argue, sometimes comes at the expense of the child‘s psychological well-being
which is subordinated. The psychological interests of the child can often be an
equally important consideration if not the most important46.

Ignorance of Public Policy

It is also alleged47 that the best interests standard can act against the interests of
public policy. Specifically, public policy might demand that incidental
characteristics of parents – for example, the sexual persuasion, financial
resources (beyond a minimum level) or religious affiliation48 – should have little

45

Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York,
1973. at p 4.
46
This weakness seems to have been appreciated in this jurisdiction given the range of factors
stated to be of relevance in s.2 of the Guardianship of Infants act, 1964.
47
For example by John Eslter in Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child,
University of Chicago Law Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
48
One could imagine how, in a Re Tilson [1951] IR 1 situation, the best interests standard could
have, somewhat unfairly, tilted the balance in favour of the parent with the more socially
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or no legal significance. Elster summarises the issue well: ―A society committed
to the value of equality must often treat its citizens as if they were equal when in
fact they are not.‖49 On a purely utilitarian analysis, the aforementioned
incidental characteristics could achieve an unnerving importance. Elster cites the
English case of S v S50 - where a mother was denied custody of her child because
she was a lesbian – as an example of the extremes of utilitarianism in this
context51. It is surely desirable that the sexual persuasion of the parent should be
of little importance in custody cases.

Encouraging Intervention

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue that the best interests standard mitigates
against the child‘s best interests by overly encouraging intervention. They argue
that the standard ―often mistakenly leads them [courts and state agencies] into
believing that they have greater power for doing ―good‖ than ―bad‖.52 They
argue that intervention is often psychologically damaging to the child – even if it
is sometimes needed to prevent more serious harm – and therefore should be
restricted. The limitations of intervention alleged by the authors will be
addressed later in the chapter but it is only common sense the state taking the
place of families is not an ideal outcome.

‗acceptable‘ religion. While it might be alleged that this is exactly what happened in this case, the
case was not decided on the basis of the best interests of the child.
49
Elster, Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, University of Chicago Law
Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at p 28.
50
S v S, 1 Fam. L. Rep. 143 (1980).
51
Note that this is cited as an example of the extremes of the standard; it is accepted that UK law
has moved on in this respect.
52
Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York,
1973 at p 63.
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Criticisms in an Irish Context

Obviously, many of the above criticisms would be moderated by the fact that a
best interests standard in the Irish Constitution would be subject to the substantial
deference and protections given to the constitutional family. However, herein lies
another criticism. If the family protections and references to the child‘s
inalienable and imprescriptible rights are retained, what effect would a best
interests standard be capable of having? It is submitted that, in a Re JH, an
infant53/Baby Ann54 situation, the presumption that a child‘s best interests are
found in the marital family and the child‘s inalienable right to be a member of
the family would take precedence over the child‘s best interests, even if the best
interests standard was given constitutional status. This would be all the more
likely if the standard was provided for by way of ordinary legislation, as was
proposed in the 2007 Bill.

In a case similar to HW and CW55, the best interests standard would have no
application whatsoever. The standard would not overcome the jurisdictional
concerns that the majority felt were the primary issue in that case. Moreover, as
already mentioned, it was implicit that the best interests standard proposed by the
2007 Bill was to be limited to custody, guardianship, adoption and access and not
to have any application to such ‗upbringing‘ disputes.

One could argue that the best interests standard could be effective if a new
balance between state, family and child was adopted. However it is hard to see
53

Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374.
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69

how this could be achieved. If the family protections were removed, all the above
criticisms would come into play. If they were retained, it is hard to see how the
best interests standard could play anything more than a subsidiary role – to the
family protections, the presumption that the child‘s best interests are found in the
family and the child‘s natural right to be a member of the family – in the
constitutional hierarchy of rights. Given the ‗natural‘ legitimacy and primacy
ascribed to the family in the Irish Constitution it is unlikely that a best interests
standard could co-exist in any sort of balance. Without it, the best interests
standard can be reasonably criticised as being indeterminate and subjective,
overly concentrated on competing rights, unjust, self-defeating and overly
disposed towards intervention. One might reasonably contend that the best
interests standard and natural law are in fact mutually exclusive.

Section D – Rights Based Approaches

Introduction

Despite concerns over the suitability of the best interest standard, there is an
increasing body of opinion that holds that constitutional provisions and family
legislation should be more concentrated on the children‘s interests56. Even
proponents of limited state intervention sometimes argue that the law is too
concerned with disputes between parents and the state.57 The concept of
children‘s rights is often posed as a resolution. The aim of this section is to

56

See for example the Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin,
1996 or Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005.
57
See, for example, Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1975 at p 1001.
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critique the suitability of rights based approaches in general however a particular
emphasis will be laid on children‘s rights models. This focus is justified because
parental rights are already enshrined in the constitutional order and children‘s
rights are often held up as an answer to constitutional child protection58.

Children’s Rights Models

Some argue that children are best protected by tilting the rights balance in favour
of children. These models give children the operative rights and relegate parents
to parties of secondary concern. James G. Dwyer has proposed such a model59.
He argues that the concentration on children‘s rights is justified by the fact that
parents undertook their duties voluntarily and because the children‘s interests
concerned are of more importance than the alleged parental interests60.

Dwyer rejects traditional arguments that parents‘ rights are justifiably based on
children‘s interests. He contends that it is not self-evident that there should be a
connection between parents‘ beliefs and their children‘s beliefs61. Furthermore,
he argues that models based on parents‘ rights encourage legal tendencies that
ignore and forget the child and its interests62. Dwyer also asserts that parental
rights are ―conceptually awkward‖63. This is because rights generally exist to
protect a right-holder‘s self determination and personal integrity and do not
58

See, for example, the submissions of AIM Family Services (at A21), the Church of Ireland (at
A41-A42), and Barnardos (at A36) to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution,
Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.
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Ibid at p 1435.
63
Ibid at p 1430.

71

generally give power over another individual, the primary feature of parental
rights in this context64.

Dwyer is equally critical of arguments that parents are entitled to the rights based
on their own interest, namely their interest in protecting their sense of enjoyment
of parenthood. Three criticisms of this position are provided. Firstly, he proposes
that the intensity of parental urges is not in itself a justification and, secondly, it
fails to explain the anomaly of the existence of rights of control over other
individuals. Moreover, he argues, talking of rights is unnecessary and privileges
could be just as effective65. Essentially, his position is that parental rights
―ultimately rest on nothing more than the ability of the politically more powerful
class of persons to enshrine in the law their domination of a politically less
powerful class, and on an outmoded view that members of the subordinated
group are not persons in their own right.‖66

Rhetoric of Rights

While Dwyer raises some valuable criticisms of parental rights, his general
contention that these flaws can be rectified by providing children with substantial
rights should be questioned. This over-concentration on rights has been widely
criticised and the idea that children‘s rights can adequately protect children is
challengeable on several grounds, as shall be seen. It is argued that such models
fail to escape the rhetoric or cult of rights. As Wardle puts it: ―They [children‘s
rights proponents] see law as a secular Messiah, a cure-all for every social ill, a
64
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big yellow social bulldozer that can shove away the old problems and build new
temples of goodness.‖67 It should be noted that this is not to contend that rights
are useless – indeed, they will be highly important in any model – but rather that
they cannot provide the answer on their own.

Overvaluing Rights

The most common criticism is that children‘s rights approaches overvalue rights,
ignore their flaws and the ways of thinking that they produce. There exists a
perfect example of the limitations of rights in this jurisdiction in the case of
North Western Health Board v HW and CW68. In that case the court held that
even if the relevant right did exist, the court did not have the constitutional
jurisdiction to enforce the right. Wardle points out that rights are often subjective
and unstable and can be abused. Again, the Irish experience produces a case in
point in Re JH69 where a right that ostensibly belonged to the child – the right to
be part of a marital family – worked very much in the favour of its parents, and
arguably against the child. In addition, as Carl Schneider argues, rights talk
encourages us to think of what we are not constrained from doing rather than
what we ought to do.70

Undervaluing the Family
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Wardle proposes that, in addition to overvaluing the power and effectiveness of
rights, children‘s rights advocates undervalue the importance of the family71. He
suggests that with reports of child abuse, premarital sex, family failures etc.
―…constantly in the background… some children's rights advocates not
surprisingly think that marriage is a failed institution and that parenting is
untrustworthy.‖72 He argues that this is an inaccurate conclusion and that it
ignores the majority of successful families that go unreported. The net effect of
such conclusions and the resulting concentration on children‘s rights is,
according to Woodhouse, that we ―…encourage families in trouble to atomize
into units with independent claims of right, rather than coalescing around
children's concrete needs.‖73

Abdication of Communal and Societal Responsibility

A further criticism of rights approaches in general is that they encourage
isolation and ostensibly relieve the community of its obligation to protect
children either by portraying children as having the necessary rights to protect
themselves or by providing families with rights that protect against community
or state interference. Woodhouse summarises this phenomenon: ―It keeps
neighbours and even family at arm's length, excuses the community from
accepting real responsibility for the plight of ―other people's children,‖ and, as
Mary Ann Glendon asserts, ―it robs us of a political language for expressing our
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collective stake in children's welfare.‖74 Insofar as it isolates families or allows
them to become isolated, this leaves children more vulnerable to abuse75.

Moreover, rights approaches obfuscate the role poverty plays in damaging family
life. Huntington asserts that they fail to address the support families often need
and ―foster conflict, rather than collaboration, between the state and families.‖76
She concludes as follows: ―No amount of more careful calibration of those rights
will solve the problems facing families in the child welfare system.‖77

The Adversarial Process

The allocation of rights to individuals within in a family promotes an adversarial
process which has been particularly persistent in this jurisdiction. This process
would seem to be totally inappropriate to dealing with many family law issues
and this has been continuously highlighted by children‘s rights and family groups
in Ireland. Ryan laments how it ―rewards vigorous debate, mud-slinging and
point-scoring.‖78 Huntington felt that the over-emphasis had caused ―…the
wrong kind of involvement in the lives of troubled families, resulting in over-
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and underprotection of everyone‘s rights and a serious misallocation of
resources.‖79

Conceptual Difficulties

There is also a concern that rights approaches in family contexts can be
misleading and confusing. An example would be claims such as rights to family
autonomy. This can be misleading and conceptually questionable in that the
claimed right essentially relates to self-determination of the family, but this right
will often be used to elevate the rights of certain individuals within the family
over others. In the UK, the notion of ‗parental rights‘ has been abandoned
precisely because of the conceptual flaws inherent. In 1982 the Law Commission
contended that the term was ―not only inaccurate as a matter of juristic analysis
but also misleading as a use of ordinary language.‖80

Conclusion

The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that rights – parental, state or
children‘s – can be of no use in an alternative constitutional order. The aim was
to illustrate that they can never be the sole answer. An Irish observer should not
need to be reminded of the limitations of rights; they are well illustrated by the
relative invisibility of the child in the Irish constitutional order, despite the
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extensive Article 40.1 rights afforded to children on the basis of G v Bord
Uchtála81 and other cases.

Section E – Limited Intervention Models

Introduction

Another potential model for a reformed constitutional provision could be inspired
by the so-called limited intervention models. These models generally maintain
that the child is ―…at risk, dependent and without capacity to or authority to
decide what is ―best‖ [for itself]‖.82 They draw on statistics that support the view
that state intervention generally has a negative effect on the child and that,
consequently, it should be limited. It should be noted that many of these models
are substantially more liberal than the model presided over by the Constitution of
Ireland. They are also far more focused on the needs of the child and draw their
conclusions from objective utilitarian analyses rather than the somewhat
unsubstantiated faith in the family that persists in this jurisdiction.

Beyond the Best Interests of the Child

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit‘s 1973 work ‗Beyond the Best Interests of the Child‘
represents arguably the most influential and renowned limited intervention
model. While their model is often classified as a limited intervention model,
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many of their premises and conclusions would appear liberal to a degree that
would be incompatible with Bunreacht na h‘Éireann.

The authors enunciate several basic principles. Firstly, they portend to
concentrate on the child‘s best psychological interest which, they argue, is often
subordinated83. They also undertake to make the child‘s best interests
paramount84. Despite this regard for the child‘s interests, the authors maintain
that they have a preference for privacy and for minimum state intervention85.
They state that this preference, ―is reinforced by our recognition that law is
incapable of effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate and
complex a relationship as that between a parent and a child.‖86 The crux of their
theory is contained in three guidelines which will be assessed in turn.

The first is that placement decisions should safeguard the child‘s need for
continuity87. The authors present a series of potential negative impacts that can
be made on the child due to a failure to maintain the child‘s continuity of
relationships, routine and environment88. To this end, they recommend that foster
placements should be ―as permanent as the placement of a newborn with
biological parents.‖89 The authors recognise the potential value of adoption in
this respect but they are critical of waiting periods, probation periods and
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protracted processes in general90. They also criticise the potential delaying
impact of appeals and unduly slow legal proceedings in the context of adoption91.

The authors would doubtless be unimpressed with Ireland‘s adoption procedure.
Shannon has described it as a ―rigorous assessment procedure‖92. The protracted,
two-stage consent system is virtually destined to give rise to legal disputes93.
Furthermore, the system espouses the arbitrary distinction between the standards
applied to the adoption of marital and non-marital children illustrated by Baby
Ann94 and Re JH, an infant95.

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit‘s second guideline is that proceedings and
placements should reflect the child‘s sense of time96. They allege that children
tend to find parental absence extremely overwhelming97. Consequently, judicial
delay can be very damaging to the child. Noting the speed with which
proceedings regarding blood transfusions98 can be effected, they propose that all
decisions regarding child placement should be made ―with all deliberate
speed‖99. To this end, they propose that, in adoption, infants should be legally
placed with adoptive parents before birth and in general, before availability100.
They also argue that the time necessary for a finding of abandonment/neglect
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should be the time which would be relevant to the child and its perception of the
need for outside interference101.

Their final guideline holds that decisions should take into account the law‘s
inability to make long term predictions102. They argue that the law may claim to
establish relationships whereas, in fact, all it can do is give recognition to
existing ones103. Citing Bentham‘s ‗crude instrument‘ truism, they summarise
their position thusly: ―It [the law] may be able to destroy human relationships;
but it does not have the power to compel them to develop.‖104

Incorporating their three primary guidelines, they propose the following standard
to be used by courts in all proceedings as to the placement of a child: ―the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child‘s growth and
development‖105. They argue that this standard avoids the drawbacks of the best
interests standard and conveys the fact that the child has already been a victim
and should not suffer any further. The ‗least detrimental alternative‘ is to
―remind decision-makers that their task is to salvage as much as possible out of
an unsatisfactory situation.‖106

The Advantages of the ‘Least Detrimental Alternative’ Standard
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The advantages cited by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit in their principles and
guidelines are convincing in themselves. Their preference for limiting state
intervention as much as possible is a laudable ideal. It is surely preferable to have
families conduct the majority of parenting and reserve the State‘s power to
intervene in the majority of cases. However this preference is counter-balanced
by an intention to keep the child‘s interests paramount. It is submitted that this is
the most sensible approach. It balances the need for the state to respect the family
and the need for the state to protect the child when necessary.

The authors‘ guidelines also espouse ideals that would surely be beneficial in a
constitutional order. The authors make good cases for the protection of a child‘s
continuity and for the recognition of the child‘s sense of time. The relative
weakness of the law in making long term predictions and dealing with the
complex area of the family has long been recognised. These principles are drawn
together well in the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard. However the
comparative value of the standard is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison
with the best interests standard and with rights based approaches.

In the first place, the fact that the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard is more
specific as to its essence and intent means that it is less likely than the more
interpretive best interests standard to be indeterminate and therefore subjective.
While the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard does place an emphasis on the
interests of the child, it does so while retaining a preference for family privacy
and limiting intervention. In this sense it obviates many of the disadvantages of
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the best interests standard such as the rhetoric of rights, the overvaluing of
intervention and the undervaluing of the family.

The standard also holds certain advantages over rights-based models. Again, the
value of the family is emphasised and, by definition, the ‗least detrimental
alternative‘ standard does not overvalue itself as a remedy. The relative weakness
of the law to remedy familial situations is accepted. At the same time the ‗least
detrimental alternative‘ standard does not abdicate its responsibility to protect
children nor to support the family and the paramountcy of children‘s interests is
espoused. Finally, in highlighting the need to provide the least detrimental
alternative, the standard relaxes the emphasis on rights and, by extension, the
emphasis on the adversarial process.

Children’s Interests and Limited Intervention

Despite the fact that many subsequent limited intervention models have
nominally claimed to be in search of ‗the least detrimental alternative‘107, few
have held the interests of children in the same regard as Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit. Michael Wald, for example, claims society‘s political commitment to
diversity of views and religion as a justification for limited intervention108. In
setting his (restrictive) intervention standard, Wald, accepts that it might prohibit
intervention in some cases where it would be beneficial to the child in the name
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of the greater good of limiting state intervention109. To anyone concerned with
child protection, this would seem to be an unacceptable concession. His agenda
also becomes clear as he refers to anecdotal reports of state agencies coercing
families into placing children in welfare voluntarily. 110

Conclusion

It is submitted that adoption of the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard would
afford the constitutional order many advantages. It would be a more appropriate
standard to govern the area of child placement under the Constitution than the
current best interests standard (in the case of non-marital children) or the
presumption that the best interests are found in the family (in the case marital
children). The precise applications of the standard will be assessed in greater
detail in chapter four.

However it is important to be cautious when grouping limited intervention
advocates together. Dwyer points out that it is common for limited intervention
advocates to couch their language in terms of ‗family autonomy‘ and ‗family
rights‘111. In reality, their agenda is often the protection of parents and their
ability to control their children. Limited intervention models may well provide
the best basis for a constitutional amendment however one should distinguish
between those that seek to best serve children in addition to parents, families and
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society and those whose primary goal is to preserve religious and cultural
practices under the guise of family autonomy.

Section F – Focusing on the Family

Introduction

It is noticeable that many of the above models adopt individualistic approaches,
stressing the rights of certain parties over others. An alternative approach is the
supportive theory which attempts to focus on helping families as a whole. This is
not to be confused with limited intervention models that seek to prevent the state
from interfering with families. Rather, this model encourages intervention where
necessary, not to take children away from families, but to help families to
provide for and protect their children. The focus is on helping families survive
and prosper in spite of their problems. Consequently, state intervention is seen as
a potentially valuable asset for parents.

Problem Solving Models

In her 2006 paper ‗Rights Myopia in Children‘s Welfare‘, Clare Huntington
proposes a shift from rights-based approaches to a problem-solving approach112.
She bases her argument on the widely accepted idea that foster care and
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intervention is not the ideal result for authorities dealing with child welfare113.
Her answer is to argue for a shift in focus from rights based models and court
proceedings to a procedure aimed at helping families to solve their problems.

Huntington‘s primary argument is that since poverty can often be the cause of
parental failings and since the state is not doing enough to alleviate the poverty;
the state has no right to intervene to take the children away from the parents. It is
surely the case that parents, children and the state have an interest in preventing
state intervention. Huntington argues that helping families is the best way to
secure this.

Central to her theory of problem solving and family aid is the concept of case
conferencing, a process in which social workers, family members community
members, professionals and in many cases parents and children convene in a
conference to draft a plan as to how the child is to be provided for114. Case
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conferencing, she argues, encompasses several important principles, namely, that
a child is best raised in its own family, that families have that responsibility and
should be supported, that families are capable of making quick decisions in
response to changing circumstances and that they are experts on the solutions
needed115.

The Values of Focusing on the Family and Case Conferencing

The value of the family in raising children is widely accepted116. Huntington
cites many recent positive international studies of case conferencing systems.
She shows that studies have suggested that case conferencing reduces subsequent
abuse117. It has also been demonstrated that conferences produces plans in the
vast majority of cases118 and that these plans often require more of a parent than
an agency typically would119 and that participants report ―satisfaction with the
process and result.‖120 The placement of the child, if necessary, would most often
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be with a relative. The process would also bring about substantial savings for the
state121.

Chandler and Giovanucci also give a very favourable review of case
conferencing. They highlight the reduction in court caseload, the inclusion of
parents and family members, the increases in transparency and humaneness of
proceedings, the increase in the speed of cases and improvements in familyagency communication122. However case conferencing provides further
advantages.

Maintaining Rights

Insofar as case conferencing seeks to limit the influence of competing rights, it
does not dispense with them completely. Generally, parties maintain the right to
veto the conference and go to court123. Nevertheless, Huntington points out that
in 95% of cases in the jurisdictions in which the model has been tried, there has
been no need for court enforcement124. Therefore, while there is de jure retention
of rights, they are effectively absent from the majority of cases.

Dispensing with the Adversarial System
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The logical extension of the fact that there are fewer court proceedings is that
there is less use of the adversarial system. As already mentioned, this has been
consistently highlighted as a problem in Ireland125. The child is not forced to be
the subject of confusing and overbearing court proceedings and is instead the
subject of conciliatory, solution orientated conference proceedings. Indeed, the
child might not need to be involved. This also aids the child in that proceedings
are speeded up as court time is no longer a requirement.

Addressing the Role of Poverty

It is consistently pointed out that rights-based approaches fail to appreciate the
role of poverty and other external factors in inhibiting the growth of healthy
families126. A recent study showed that 14% of Irish children live in consistent
poverty127. Garrison argues that poverty could completely inhibit the state‘s
ability to solve family issues: ―Unless we reduce poverty and its related stresses,
the least drastic alternative will remain an elusive goal.‖128 Focusing on the
family and case conferencing could go some way towards addressing this
imbalance. Huntington points out that even the change in rhetoric could have a
positive effect: ―Changing the frame for the child welfare case could help
reorient society‘s views of abuse and neglect away from the view that abuse and
neglect are products of parental pathology, and toward a view of social
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responsibility, where a broader group—both the immediate community and the
state—claims responsibility for the larger circumstances that led to the abuse or
neglect.‖129

Case Conferencing and Problem Solving Models in Ireland

The values of case conferencing and a generally more supportive model have
been accepted in Ireland. Indeed, part 2 of the Children Act, 2001 provides for
the procedure. Shannon observed how the process brings the focus on to family
in that it represents ―a significant transfer of power from the State, exercised
principally by the courts, to the community.‖130 He felt that the attendance of
children was one of the most progressive elements131. The concept was
introduced in New Zealand largely to respect diverse cultural approaches to
family organization. In this respect it could prove especially valuable in a more
culturally diverse Ireland132. While the decision as to whether a right to a case
conference should be guaranteed to all children in the Constitution – as it is by
legislation in New Zealand – is beyond the remit of this thesis, the procedure
would might well be inherent in any constitutional order that focused on helping
families.
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Conclusion

It is noticeable from the foregoing that much of the focus is on cases of child
neglect and abandonment. This is likely to be the legal area in which the
problem-solving model (elevated to a constitutional norm) would have most
influence. Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that the problem-solving
model would be entirely limited to such cases. It is possible to theorise how the
model could affect adoption disputes and even cases of temporary state
intervention such as the North Western Health Board v HW and CW133 situation.

Section G – Conclusion

Sections B and C illustrated how the majority of the recent proposals for the
amendment of the family provisions of the Constitution have been
underwhelming and would most likely prove incapable of delivering on the goal
of child protection. In particular, the best interests standards is too often invoked
as a reliable replacement for the current order. Section D also criticised rightsbased approaches as not having a sufficient degree of sophistication to be the
ultimate answer to the problems of constitutional child protection. Therefore, the
stated aim should not be to produce a constitutional order that protects the best
interests of the child or children‘s rights. Rather, child protection should be the
goal. To this end, sections D, E and F presented several models that might
provide certain advantages. Chapter four will attempt to combine these models
with the aim of producing a more equitable constitutional order.
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CHAPTER FOUR – A NEW MODEL FOR
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN IN IRELAND

Section A – Introduction

Chapter one illustrated how Bunreacht na hÉireann prescribes a jurisprudence
that obscures the interests of the child and stresses the rights and privileges of
parents first and foremost. It was also shown that this balance can be very
damaging to children and that it can inhibit the state in attempts it makes to
protect children. Chapter two presented the argument that our current
constitutional provisions were influenced by a philosophy that is anachronistic
and inappropriate in the context of modern society and will continue to be so in
the future, perhaps more so. Chapter three assessed a range of alternative
philosophies on which a new constitutional order could be based. This chapter
will combine the efforts of the previous three by suggesting an alternative model
for the constitutional protection of the child. In this respect, chapter four will be
closely linked to chapter three. The aim is to draw from the philosophies
examined in chapter three and draw their best elements into a combined model.

Initially, several guiding considerations will have to be elucidated and addressed
and these will be dealt with in section B. The suggested model will be dealt with
in four sections. Firstly, the justifications for guaranteeing and limiting parental
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rights will be assessed in section C. Secondly, section D will address how a new
order could properly protect the rights of the child. Section E will examine how
the limits of state intervention might be set. Finally, section F will draw together
the arguments made in the previous three sections with the conclusions made in
chapter three and attempt to draw them into a combined model. The potential
applications of this model will be briefly assessed in section G.

Section B - Considerations

The Need for Constitutional Provisions

It has already been demonstrated that there is a need to reassess the constitutional
provisions on the family as a whole to properly protect children. This could be
achieved by deleting the family provisions in the Constitution and delegating a
full power to legislate in the area to the Oireachtas. The vast majority of
jurisdictions broadly employ such an approach1. However, given the fact that the
Constitution already deals with the family and the child, it is unlikely that such
an approach would be popular. Citizens would most likely want a direct say in
the formation of any new jurisprudence, if it was decided to do away with the old
one2. Furthermore, there are several advantages to having constitutional
provisions in the area and reasons why this would particularly practicable in an
Irish context.

1

For example, the US Constitution has nothing to say on the family or the child. Jurisdictions
(such as the UK) that do not have a codified constitution do not have to consider the issue at all at
a constitutional (in the conventional meaning of the word) level.
2
The 1996 divorce amendment supports this contention. In that case, the divorce prohibition was
replaced by a specific set of provisions governing the conditions in which divorce could be
permitted.
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Firstly, the Irish Constitution has generally3 proved especially flexible and
capable of adapting to new times and contexts. It would be regrettable not to take
advantage of this. Secondly, if any change was made to make the family more
vulnerable to state intervention, it is surely desirable to have the express approval
of the people. Furthermore, Ireland is a relatively small constitutional democracy
and consequently the national constitution is arguably more capable of dealing
with such issues than in larger, more socially and politically diverse jurisdictions.
It should be noted at this point that the aim here is to propose a general
philosophy and not to exhaustively set out every element of a new provision.

The Definition of the Family

It is not intended for this chapter to deal with other issues regarding the family
and the constitution in any great detail. However one issue merits some attention
at this point. There has been substantial debate as to the definition of the family
in the Constitution4. The courts have held5, and it is largely accepted, that the
Constitution only refers to the family based on a heterosexual marriage6.
Arguably, this fact can be damaging to children whose parents are in

3

The word ‗generally‘ is included because, while the Constitution has been considered flexible as
regards society and law generally, one might argue that the Constitution has not been very
flexible in the area of family law.
4
See, for example, the submissions to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution,
Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.
5
See Chapter 1.
6
In light of this, the section 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 specifically precludes
recognition of a same sex marriage. This was recently confirmed in Zappone and Gilligan v
Revenue Commissioners [2006] IEHC 404.
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relationships outside this definition7. However, a full discussion of this nebulous
and controversial topic would be outside the ambit of this dissertation. It should
suffice to say that this paper will attempt to suggest constitutional provisions that
prescribe that the family – however it is defined – is the ideal institution in which
parents can raise their children and in which children can be protected.

The Need for a Compromise Solution

The American literature illustrates how new models are contentious and rarely
universally popular8. However they are at least based on cost-benefit analyses,
and not on a naturally divined belief in the ultimate authority of the family.
Properly protecting families and children and the rights of parents demands a
more sophisticated approach than the current one. As Dwyer puts it: “The child's
situation calls for tailor-made solutions, not a one-size-fits-all approach‖9. The
most obvious conclusion, given the extensive academic debate, is that a single
philosophy will not provide the answer.

The Applications of the Provision

Perhaps the biggest limitation of the current provisions on the family is the
failure to clearly distinguish between the range of situations to which the
provisions can apply.

7

For a discussion of the damages done to children due to the lack of recognition of
‗psychological parents‘ see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1755 (1993).
8
See Chapter 3, pp 9-33.
9
James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note,
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053 at pp 1054-1055.

95

Evidently, the cases of Baby Ann10 and North Western Health Board v HW and
CW11 presented very different considerations. Yet Article 42.5 was invoked and
held to be relevant in both cases. From a simple reading of the Article, it appears
to be specifically drafted to deal with permanent state intervention to replace
unfit parents. In this respect, it is not designed to deal with conflicts between
adoptive and natural parents nor to mandate short-term interventions such as the
one sought in HW and CW12. The specific applications and extent of Article 42.5
have been matters of judicial debate and disagreement throughout the
development of the jurisprudence in the area. These issues still remains unclear
to a certain extent.

Therefore, it should be remembered that any new model will have to apply
effectively to a number of different and diverse situations. Firstly, the state may
have to make a temporary intervention, involving a short lived removal of the
child from its parents‘ custody while not affecting the long term guardianship
rights of the parent. Typically, this will be where a court orders something to be
performed in the child‘s interests despite parental objections. This is what
occurred in the recent case of Baby Janice13. Secondly, the state may have to
make a temporary intervention to remove the child from parental custody and
guardianship, potentially for an extended period of time. This will be the case
where a child is put into medium or long term foster care.

10

Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374.
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
12
Ibid.
13
Baby Janice, Unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004.
11
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Thirdly, the state may have to make a permanent intervention, terminating the
parents‘ guardianship and custody rights. An example of this under the current
order is where a legitimate adoption has occurred or where a parent loses custody
of their child under the grounds set down in Article 42.5. A further situation
would be in the case of divorce or separation where the state has to choose which
parent should have custody of the child14. While these applications will be dealt
with in some detail as regards a proposed model, it should be remembered that
the aim of this paper is to propose a general model. A detailed analysis of the
application of the model to specific areas of family law would be beyond the
remit of the thesis.

Section C – Supporting the Family

Introduction

A necessary pre-cursor to proposing a new constitutional model for child
protection is the task of establishing what role and what status parents and
families are to be afforded. This section will analyse the extent and limits to the
rights, duties and obligations of these important actors. The presented argument
will be that while parents should be afforded some prima facie rights, the overall
aim must be to support the family. Therefore, the state should not be limited by
an over concentration on individual rights.

Parents’ Right to Rights

14

Where there is no parental agreement.
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It is submitted that approaches such as those of Dwyer15 go too far. Without
advocating parental hegemony, surely biological parents deserve some prima
facie rights to custody and guardianship of their children. These rights are not as
anomalous and unjustifiable as Dwyer suggests16. Firstly, parents have had a
uniquely influential role in the creation and formation of the child. They will
almost certainly have gone to great effort to raise the child, even if it is very
young. Parents have an intimate biological and social relationship with the child,
one that the state can hardly hope to replicate. Also, as Wardle has pointed out,
despite the unrepresentative and misleading media coverage, the vast majority of
families are caring, effective and indeed ideal units for children to be brought up
in17. The state should recognise these facts in the form of legal protections.

Dwyer contends that the intensity of the parental relationship is not itself a
justification for parental rights18 and that, in any event, privileges would be more
appropriate than rights19. He compares the parent attempting to assert legal rights
over their child with other legal situations and concludes that there is something
conceptually flawed about the idea of holding rights over another individual20.

15

James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994). A similar model is proposed by Elizabeth
Bartholet in Nobody’s Children: Abuse, Neglect, Foster Drift and the Adoption Alternative
(1999).
16
For example, James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1435.
17
Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children,
27 Loy U. Chi. L.J. 321, Winter 1996 at p 327.
18
James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1349.
19
Ibid at p 1440.
20
Ibid at p 1407.
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However, this fails to appreciate the degree of effort that parents have put into
the relationship and the unique and irreplaceable role they have played. The
relationship of the biological parent to its child cannot be made analogous to any
other legal position. It is, quite simply, unique. When this is appreciated, it can
be understood why parents‘ rights seem ―…inconsistent with certain principles
underlying all other individual rights recognized in our society.‖21 Attempts to
atomize or control the relationship in any serious way will inevitably face
problems.

Advantages of Granting Parents Rights

However, beyond parental entitlements, there are other justifications and
advantages to guaranteeing parental rights in a Constitution. In the first place, on
a symbolic level, it is important that the family is recognised as the primary unit
in society. The state should enunciate its support of the family to illustrate value
of the institution. It is also important to prevent parents believing that the state
can easily intervene and remove their children. Parents must be able to form a
bond with their children on some presumption of permanence, within reason. The
law must provide a context in which parents are not apprehensive about
procreating and in which they can assess their future with their child with a
degree of certainty.

Dwyer rejects the argument that limiting parental rights would weaken the bond
between parents and children. He argues that such a claim is questionable and
21

James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1371.
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lacking in supporting evidence22. However, Dwyer himself recognised the effect
that rhetoric can have in the context of rights when he warned of the general
effect that over-emphasising parental rights can have23. Equally, one can presume
that failing to provide adequate protections for the family could undermine
society‘s impressions of families and parent-child relationships in some way. It
would send a message that the state does not hold the family or family
relationships in any great esteem and it would undermine the perceived
respectability of families.

Huntington – despite arguing that an over-emphasis on rights can be damaging
and counter productive – maintained that rights, including parental rights, would
remain an essential part of any model: ―The basic interests underlying rights –
that the state should not intervene in a family absent a showing of parental
unfitness, and that children should be safe in their homes – should be retained in
any legal model.‖24 This point notwithstanding, while parental rights can be
accepted as being important, they should not be considered limitless or even
worthy of special protection when children are at risk.

Limiting Parental Rights

A constitutional guarantee that the family represents the primary unit group of
society, deserving of respect, does not necessarily require the wide ranging
protections the family currently gets in Ireland. The constitution can promote and

22

Ibid at p 1347.
At 1435 where he felt that this limited and isolated the interests of children
24
Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 687.
23
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respect the family while at the same time providing for state intervention when
families fail to live up to minimum societal standards of parenting. However
many would assert that the family is entitled to some primordial right to freedom
from intervention and that the state should be restrained from intervening in all
but the most exceptional cases25. These arguments will now be assessed.

Preserving the Traditional Family

Francis Beytagh has argued that Article 41 is ―uniquely appropriate‖ in the
modern world. He justified this position in the following way: ―Concern about
the deterioration of the family as an essential unit in a society‘s structure has
never been greater, and yet it remains more unusual than commonplace for the
topic to be addressed in a nation‘s fundamental legal instrument. Ireland is thus
to be commended.‖26 This argument is regularly invoked by conservatives and
pro-family groups27. The argument is, essentially, that the current constitutional
protections afforded to the family can act as a means of preserving the family, an
institution that is widely accepted as being vital to society.

However, one must question exactly what sort of effect such constitutional
protections, and their legislative and judicial manifestations, actually have. As
already mentioned, the rhetoric and aspirations provided in a constitution can be
important. One could not deny that such provisions permit and in some cases

25

Given the wording of Article 41 and the multiple natural law references therein, this is surely
the position that the current constitutional order seeks to maintain.
26
Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ireland: An American Perspective,
RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1997 at p. 118.
27
See, for example, the submission of Comhar Chriosti (at A50) to All Party Oireachtas
Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.
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oblige the law to comply with the constitutional norm. The now nonextant
divorce prohibition was a stark example of this. However, in this respect all they
do is frustrate individual citizens, preventing them from attaining legal
acceptance of what will in any case be a practical reality. This may diminish the
perceived legitimacy of the Constitution. Furthermore, a constitutional provision
has only a limited ability to frame societal consciousness, even more so if it is
out of touch with societal norms. As Ryan has illustrated, the constitutional
support of the family in this jurisdiction has not to dissuade people from forming
alternative family types28.

In the context of the family, over-emphasising family autonomy and parental
rights potentially leaves children vulnerable to abuse and harm. Wardle
summarised the limits of this argument: ―Nostalgia (usually fostered by highly
selective memories) does not qualify as a legal theory of merit. Society needs to
meet the challenges of the modern era, which is the greatest, most exhilarating,
fulfilling, and wonderful time for families, as well as the most challenging,
dangerous, and potentially disastrous time for families.‖29 Undoubtedly, a
constitution should contain some societal aspirations. However, it should not
attempt to reflect a society that does not exist nor to establish one that is not
possible.

Preserving Diversity

28

Fergus W. Ryan, Recognising Family Diversity: Children, One-Parent Families and the Law,
(2006) 9(1) IJFL 3.
29
Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children,
27 Loy U. Chi. L.J. 321, Winter 1996 at pp 323-324.
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An argument often posed is that protecting parental autonomy and parental rights
promotes diversity in a pluralist society30. Undoubtedly, the state does not want
to extend its reach so as to ignore the existence of cultures within it. However,
the law must always set limits. The law must insist on protection of certain
standards regardless of cultural norms that may contradict the standards. Liberal
democracies accept that their societies will not be entirely uniform, but they do
not grant a carte blanche. Essentially, societal diversity and child protection are
not mutually exclusive and surely the latter is a more pressing concern than the
former.

Fearing the State

Parental rights proponents often evoke fears of an over-active Platonic state,
taking the place of parents and attempting to impose itself as a parent on a
national scale. Indeed, it is consistently claimed that the constitutional
protections of the family have prevented many abuses of state power in this
jurisdiction31. Evidence is rarely raised to substantiate these claims. One must
ask why the modern, neo-liberal State would be so eager to take the place of
parents? The neo-liberal state values the role played by the family in removing a
complex and costly area from the State‘s remit and only seeks to intervene when

30

Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1975 at p 992.
31
See, for example, Duncan, The Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights, in The Report of
the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996, Appendix 22, at p 625.
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it feels the family has failed. To a substantial extent, the Orwellian fears of the
twentieth century have receded in the twenty first32.

Goldstein argues that family autonomy and parental rights prevent judges or
doctors from imposing their preferences on parents. He says that ―… a prime
function of law is to prevent one person's truth… from becoming another
person's tyranny.‖33 However, laws regularly act in this way. The majority of
citizens often set standards that minorities, sometimes very large minorities34,
may disagree with. Surely, in the same way, minimum standards can be
democratically set for parenting.

This is not to say, however, that the State will completely govern parenting but,
rather, it will step in when parenting is falling below acceptable standards. In this
respect, it is worth remembering that intervention will only occur in a small
minority of families. Almost by definition, democratically set minimum
standards will be inferior to the standards most parents set. Moreover,
intervention does not have to be in the form of removing children. The state can
act35 to protect the child without removing the child from the long or medium
term custody of the parent. The idea is not that the state should take over; it is
that it should force parents to do their job according to democratically set
minimum standards, either by actual intervention or threat thereof.

32

‗See for example, the recent efforts at a government level to limit the amount of elderly people
seeking state residential care: ‗Old-age pension likely to increase to €208‘, Miriam Donohoe, The
Irish Times, Thursday, November 30, 2006.
33
Joseph Goldstein, Medical care for the Child at risk: on State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy , The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 4, Mar, 1977, pp 645-670 at p 664.
34
The 1995 divorce referendum in Ireland represents a good example where the margin of
victory in a national referendum was just 9,098 votes.
35
For example, by ordering that certain medical procedures be carried out or not.
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The state and its laws have been consistently described as ‗too crude an
instrument‘36 to deal with family life. Goldstein believes this is because the legal
system ―does not have the capacity to deal on an individual basis with the
consequences of its decisions or to act with the deliberate speed required by a
child‘s sense of time and essential to his well being.‖37 This would appear to be a
fair criticism. The state will surely never be as flexible or adaptable as the family
as regards parenting on a regular basis. However this criticism does not extend to
impugning the state‘s ability to make one-off short term interferences such as
ordering beneficial medical treatment. Here, the law can be quite refined and
effective. At the end of the interference, the child is returned to its parents.

In his judgment in North Western Health Board v HW and CW38, Hardiman J
referred to the United States case of Buck v Bell39 to highlight the dangers of the
state assuming that it is scientifically and morally right and imposing these
assumed norms on others. While he accepted that there was no real comparison
to the case at issue, he concluded: ―The lesson of it [Buck v Bell] to my mind is
that it is better to hesitate at the threshold of compulsion, even in its most
benevolent form, than to adopt an easy but reductionist utilitarianism whose
consequences may be unpredictable.‖40

36

For example in Joseph Goldstein, Medical care for the Child at risk: on State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy , The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 4, Mar, 1977, pp 645-670.
37
Ibid at p 650.
38
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
39
Buck v Bell 274 US 200. This was the attempt of Carrie Buck, an inmate of a State institution
for the ―feeble minded‖ to avoid compulsory sterilisation on the basis, inter alia, of the equal
protection clause and the due process clause of the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution. She failed in her application and the following dicta of Mr Justice Oliver Holmes is
especially notorious: ―Three generations of imbeciles are enough‖.
40
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622 at 747.
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This would be a powerful argument but for his admitted existence of a crucial
distinction between cases such as Buck v Bell41 and HW and CW42. The
distinction is that in Buck v Bell43 the state was attempting compel a party to the
proceedings to do something. In HW and CW44, the subject, a child, was not a
party to the proceedings nor was it capable of making its own decision as to the
legal decision pertaining. In Buck v Bell, the decision was whether to compel or
not to compel the individual involved. In HW and CW45, the decision was
whether parents would compel the child not to take the PKU test, or whether the
state would compel it to take it. Essentially, it was impossible for the state to
‗hesitate at the threshold of compulsion‘ in HW and CW46. Again we are faced
with the reality that the child presents a unique dilemma for the law.

Abandoning the Family

These examples illustrate a crucial point. Often, in the context of child
protection, the state cannot be neutral, it cannot abstain. In many cases the state
will have to choose between parental autonomy and child protection, implicitly
or explicitly. From a philosophical perspective, the state acts whether it
intervenes or does not intervene. As Judith G. McMulle put it, state inaction is a
misnomer. When the state chooses not to intervene it implicitly chooses to

41

Buck v Bell 274 US 200.
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
43
Buck v Bell 274 US 200.
44
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
42
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preserve the status quo and parental rights47. Non-intervention is a policy choice
in exactly the same way that the decision to adopt an interventionist policy is.

It could also be argued that this choice – to leave parenting to parents in all but
the most extreme cases – represents an abandonment by the state of its duties to
support the family. In effect, this decision absolves the state of any duty to
support families by making sure that families are operating within social norms.
It might also be argued that, by leaving the family to its own devices, the state
abandons the family and inhibits its ability to function properly by not effectively
protecting it from poverty. McMulle highlights this problem: ―There is a fine line
between autonomy, which implies independence from outside meddling and
destructive interference, and isolation, which implies a lack of social supports
and a lack of accountability to community norms for behaviour. Isolation from
the community has been shown to have a negative impact on families.‖48

This concept is crucial. One cannot afford to restrict the state to the degree that it
cannot help families. Disadvantaged families will often need state support to
survive. The state should not be afraid to give it. Independence should not be
equated with capacity. James G. Dwyer makes a valuable addition to this
argument. He points out that it is still common for judges and commentators to
presume that non-intervention is always in the parent‘s interests and concludes:
―I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that parents do not benefit from

47

Judith G. McMulle, Privacy, Family Autonomy and the Maltreated Child, Marquette Law
Review (1992) at p 589.
48
Ibid.

107

being able to abuse their children.‖49 He points out that state intervention, even
permanent intervention, can be beneficial for the child, the family and for the
parent, in the long term in that it prevents the family from destroying itself and
preserves the potential for reconciliation in the future. This point does not have to
be limited to child abuse. Familial relationships will surely suffer when a family
is forced to live in disadvantaged circumstances due to a lack of state support.

As Dwyer points out, we should refrain from seeing intervention as being ‗for‘ a
child or ‗against‘ a parent and start framing it in what is best for the family50.
Furthermore, it must be recognised that the state has an interest in children being
raised properly and the family is widely accepted as the best model. Therefore,
the most effective model should not be concerned with vindicating or limiting the
rights of states, families, parents or children. It must be concerned with
supporting families and allowing them to do their job properly. Ultimately
though, the fact parents will err must be accepted and the law must be capable of
rectifying those mistakes.

Section D – Protecting the Rights of the Child

Introduction

It has been accepted that parents should be afforded rights and that the family
should be legally protected. However, these considerations cannot justify the

49

James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note,
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053 at p 1071.
50
James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1072.
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surrendering of the aim of child protection. It is submitted that certain basic
children‘s rights should be explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. These rights
are included to guarantee children that parents, or anybody, must treat children
according to certain minimum standards established by society. It is further
submitted that this guarantee should be less qualified than the Article 40.3
provision51; indeed, it should involve a positive constitutional obligation on the
state to make sure that children‘s rights are being vindicated.

These rights exist not to allow the state to take the place of the parent – although
in practice this may be necessary in some situations – but to allow the state to
impose its minimum standards on parents in certain situations when essentially
children‘s rights are being impaired. The elements of this proposal will now be
assessed and the specific rights that might be included will be briefly examined.
It should be remembered however that the goal of this paper is to promote a
general model and not to explore the extensive task of exhaustively enumerating
the rights needed in new model. Insofar as an examination of specific rights goes
beyond the aforementioned delimits, this is a necessary tangent as the decisions
as to which rights are chosen might be as significant as deciding whether or not
to afford children specific rights at all.

A Rights Approach

As was discussed in chapter three, rights based approaches have been widely
criticised for having a variety of inherent flaws. Nevertheless, the rights based

51

Ie it should not be limited by the proviso that the state should act ―by its laws‖
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model is appropriate here for several reasons. Firstly, it is accepted that
children‘s rights will only form a part of the solution. Other mechanisms will be
needed to endow a constitution with the capability of adequately governing law
in a range of family situations. Even the harshest critics of rights approaches
recognise the importance of rights as long as they are not held out as the ultimate
answer52.

Secondly, as Lynn Wardle has argued53, rights can be especially important in the
context of modern society. In a period when states are potentially more powerful
than they have ever been, it is recognised that certain rights should be extended
to all humans. In a more complex world, people require more to be selfsupporting. Perhaps most importantly of all in this context, Wardle points out
that many of the mediating structures in society – such as large nuclear families,
churches etc. – have disappeared or are in the process of disappearing54.
Consequently – in the absence of the protections of such institutions – positive
legal rights assume a greater importance.

Burdening the State
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Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 687.
53
Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children,
27 Loy U. Chi. L.J. 321, Winter 1996.
54
See William Duncan, ‗The Child, the Parent and the State: The Balance of Power‘ in Law &
Social Policy, Some Current Problems in Irish Law, William Duncan (ed.), Dublin University
Law Journal, 1987 at p. 20. Duncan describes how the large extended family has largely given
way to the nuclear family and that his has been accompanied by several changes, namely
increased state involvement in socialisation, education and protection of children, limits on
parents rights and recognition of children‘s right and protections (which have nevertheless, he
acknowledges, been few in number). See also 54 Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family,
Basic Books, New York, 1975 for an observation of this phenomenon in western society in
general.
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As already mentioned, any children‘s rights guarantee should oblige the state to
actively endeavour to vindicate the rights guaranteed. This is necessary because
children, unlike most rights holders, may not have the mental capacity or
physical ability to vindicate their rights. Huntington summarised this difficulty:
―This [the common conception55] conception of rights does not advance the
interests of children in the child welfare system because children simply do not
benefit from this sort of autonomy… They are not autonomous legally or
practically.‖56 It appears that the Constitutional Review Group appreciated this
problem when they advocated a ―…re-wording of the State‘s duty to the child‖.57

While the case of Baby Janice58 shows that the courts will step in when it is
absolutely necessary, surely the limits of, and justifications for, such actions
should be clearly laid out. This is further warranted by the fact that the courts are
likely to be faced with more complex and problematic cases in the future59. It is
submitted that these rights should be exhaustively and explicitly set out because
of the extra obligation imposed on the state in regard to them. Rights not
protected under this schedule would be protected by Article 40.3 where relevant.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

55

Essentially, the conception that rights-bearers are ―separate, autonomous, and responsible
individuals entitled to exercise rights and obliged to bear liabilities for their actions.‖ In Clare
Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working
Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at 664 (footnotes).
56
Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 664.
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Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 330.
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Baby Janice, Unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004.
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This possibility will be discussed later in the chapter.
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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been consistently
mooted as a valuable basis for children‘s rights and protections60. Additionally,
Ireland is a signatory to the convention and therefore morally, if not legally,
bound to comply with its aspirations. The state has been criticised for failing to
do so61. Consequently, the Convention is posited as an ideal basis for children‘s
rights. The Convention is an extensive schedule aimed at addressing a wide
variety of child related issues and applying to 195 United Nations member states.
Additionally, many of the rights proposed are already protected by Irish
constitutional law and otherwise. Therefore, much of the rights in the convention
are superfluous or irrelevant in this context. However if these surplus provisions
are stripped away, a number of valuable provisions can be identified.

Article 2 portends to extend the Convention rights to the children of all signatory
states without discrimination on any arbitrary grounds62. It would appear that
Ireland is not respecting this Article at least in that it affords ostensibly63 greater
protections to marital children than to non-marital ones. This should be remedied
in any new order of rights and it appears that this has been appreciated. The
Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 seemed to endeavour
to provide for more equal treatment between marital and non-marital children.
However, it is important that other protections are properly afforded and that the
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See the Kilkenny Incest Investigation: Report Presented to Mr Brendan Howlin TD, Minister
for Health by South Easter Health Board, The Stationary Office, Dublin, May 1993 at p 96.
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Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Ireland, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.85 (1998).
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exercise represents a levelling up rather than the levelling down that Carolan
accused the 2007 Bill of proposing64.

As regards substantive rights beyond the superfluous, Article 7.1 provided that
the child has ―a right to be registered immediately after birth, acquire a
nationality, a name and as far as possible to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.‖ Other rights provided in the Convention include a general right to
health65 and to an adequate standard of living66.

The Convention also affords some procedural rights. Most noticeably, Article 3
provides that the best interests of the child should be ―a paramount
consideration‖ in any legal action concerning children. The fact that it will be a
paramount consideration rather than the paramount consideration illustrates that
this is a watering down of what, as previously discussed, is already a somewhat
flawed standard.

The convention also provides that in ―matters‖ concerning the child, the child‘s
opinions should be heard and given due weight67. Article 12.2 provides that the
child should be ―heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting
the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body‖.
These articles are representative of a general tone in the Convention that suggests
64

Eoin Carolan, The Constitutional Consequences of Reform: Best Interests after the Amendment,
(2007) 10(3) IJFL 9 at p 14.
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66
Article 27.1 provided for a right ―of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.‖
67
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views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
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that children should have a greater role in judicial and administrative decisions
concerning them. This is consistent with many calls from academics and
specialists68 for children to be given a greater say in the decision-making process.

Procedural Rights

In their 1973 work Beyond the Best Interests of the Child69, Goldstein Freud and
Solnit made a somewhat novel suggestion in calling for children to be given a
right to a speedy hearing in court in cases regarding their placement or removal
from family. This is due to their core principle that the law should respect the
child‘s sense of time70. They note how delay in such proceedings can be very
damaging to children in such cases as children demand security and can find
parental absence overwhelming71. This problem is well illustrated by the damage
done by administrative and legal delay in Baby Ann72 and Re JH, an infant73.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit recommend that proceedings as to placements of
children should be completed ―with all deliberate speed‖74. This right would
seem to provide several crucial advantages to child protection while only mildly
inconveniencing the justice system generally.

Child Representation
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See, for example, Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 and the One Family
Conference, February 2007.
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Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York,
1973
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Ibid at p 40.
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Ibid at p 40.
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Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374
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Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375.
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Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York,
1973 at p 42.
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As regards children appearing in court, the prevailing wisdom in Ireland is that
the benefit of the child‘s participation is outweighed by the disadvantage of the
child being traumatised by the adversarial and uncompassionate nature of the
adversarial system75. As Geoffrey Shannon has observed, this has left the child
unrepresented or unheard in many cases76. Shannon argues that the best means of
obviating this shortcoming is the provision of separate legal representation of
children, a facility now provided for in this state in the form of a guardian ad
litem77.

While the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the installation of the child as a
party to the proceedings are provided for in the Children Act 2001, there are
some deficiencies. Most notably, when the child is made a party to proceedings,
a guardian ad litem cannot be appointed. Shannon calls this a ―key lacuna‖ since
―a lawyer, while talented in the advocacy of law, may not necessarily be the best
equipped to identify and advocate the social and emotional needs of a child.‖78
Many commentators79 have realised that the right to representation is a crucial
one and this position is visible in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child. A constitutional right guaranteeing children representation in legal
proceedings concerning them might well be justified.
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Section E – State Intervention

Introduction

The point has been consistently made in this paper that no amount of parental or
children‘s rights can effectively protect and provide for children. As was
discussed, the state must take an active role, within reason, in supporting families
to allow them to function properly. Nevertheless, regardless of the rights
afforded or the welfare support provided, the state will inevitably be called on to
take the place of some unworthy parents. Even the 1937 Constitution recognised
this fact80. Consequently, the boundaries of this action should be set.

It seems especially appropriate that the justifications for such intervention and
the limitations of it should be constitutionally provided. In part, this is because
such limits are currently provided for by Article 42.5. Moreover, it is surely
desirable that the highest legal authority should have something to say on such a
serious issue, namely: the situations in which children can be removed from
families. Again, a full examination of these bounds is beyond the scope of this
thesis as it strays into the realms of specific legislating. Nevertheless, a brief
examination might prove useful by illustrating how a more equitable balance
could be adopted.

Voluntary Intervention
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Most noticeably in Article 42.5.
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Marsha Garrison argues that it is important to distinguish between occasions
when the state intervenes coercively and when it intervenes on the voluntary
invitation of the parents81. She proposes that more parents actually seek welfare
than are coerced into the system. In this context, she criticises some limited
intervention models82 for failing to take voluntary care into account when
limiting intervention to cases of serious harm83. The argument is that, firstly, the
state should not be limited by standards largely set to apply to the unfortunate
context of coercive intervention. Secondly, and more importantly, different
standards should apply since the law cannot allow parents to use the state as a
substitute parent when it suits them and regain the custody of their children at
their pleasure. This may be possible because under limited intervention models
there may be a requirement that parents have abused or hurt their children for the
state to deny them custody.

This situation would be clearly unfair on children and on the state. Garrison
proposes that the concepts of child protection and public assistance should be
distinguished84. In the case of the latter, a delicate balance will have to be struck
and standards ―must be sensitive to both the minimum intervention philosophy in
regard to child protection and the state's interests in regard to cost control and
administrative efficiency.‖85 Consequently she advocates biological parents
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Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decision making: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative,
75 GEO. L. J. 1745, 1762-66 (1987) at p 1807.
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Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decision making: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative,
75 GEO. L. J. 1745, 1762-66 (1987) at p 1764.
Ibid at p 1813.
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Ibid at pp 1814-1815.
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retaining a substantial say in the upbringing of the child although not having
custody and guardianship rights86.

Permanent Coercive Intervention

Article 42.5 of the Constitution authorizes, and arguably obliges, the state to take
the place of parents in exceptional cases where ―the parents for physical or moral
reasons fail in their duty to their children‖. This provision is obviously focused
on parental failure. In that respect it is not focused on child protection nor is it
focused on supporting or helping families. In effect, it espouses a doctrine of
parental rights. These rights will be paramount under the Article 42.5 order
unless parents fail in an exceptional way. Michael Wald has observed that this
focus on parental fault is common87. He argues that this focus is undesirable.

Firstly, he points out that such a focus limits judicial consideration of the child‘s
concerns88. The knock-on effect is that statutes that adopt a parental focus are
unsophisticated and unable to deal with the complex subject that is family law.
Wald illustrates why this is: ―…all available evidence indicates that it is
extremely difficult to correlate parental behaviour or home conditions with
specific harms to a child, especially if the predicted harm involves long-term,
rather than immediate, effects of the environment. Even in very ―bad‖ homes, the
impact of the home environment will vary depending upon the age of a child, the
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nature of family interactions, developmental differences among children, and
many other factors.‖89

Consequently, courts may make interventions on the basis of parental fault where
the child‘s needs may not warrant it. Equally, and as Wald points out, a lack of
parental fault may render courts unwilling to intervene in a situation in which it
is necessary for child protection90. However Wald proceeds to prescribe a very
restrictive model limiting intervention to cases where the harm to the child is
―serious‖91. He accepts that this standard will leave children unprotected in
certain exceptional cases.92 Surely, such a surrender is not acceptable.

Garrison provides a less compromising approach93. However, Garrison concedes
that ultimately, ―courts will thus be forced to confront the question of when
parental rights to obtain the child's return should be terminated.‖94 She argues
that custody rights should not be permanently terminated until three years of care
but that an application should then be lodged automatically. This time period is
due to ―the low risk of instability during the early years of placement and the fact
that many parents regain their children during this time‖95.
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It should be noted that termination will not be automatic and the application‘s
success will be subject to certain conditions. Firstly, there must be conditions that
require continued foster care96. Secondly, Garrison argues that there must be
evidence that the parent has failed to make substantial progress toward achieving
reunification, despite meaningful assistance from the foster care agency97. This
achieves Garrison‘s stated aims of protecting children, giving parents adequate
time to resolve issues and affording child welfare agencies adequate incentives to
ensure that parents receive services needed to achieve reunification.

Such an approach would appear to be more satisfactory. Many commentators
have lamented the many years children have to spend in care because
constitutional protections prevent them being adopted98. As Garrison points out,
children become less and less likely to return to their parents the longer they
spend in foster care99. Termination and adoption would provide the permanency
and stability they need.
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She further argues that termination should be available without 3 years
placement in certain exceptional cases100. These largely correspond to the cases
outlined in Article 42.5. in cases of ―abandonment or if, due to mental or
physical illness, mental retardation, or long-term imprisonment, the parent is
incapable of providing adequate child care in the foreseeable future.‖

Conclusion

This brief examination of the bounds of intervention illustrates one crucial
conclusion. It is essential that intervention standards are set according to the
requirements of child protection and not according to parental fault and the result
of rights balancing. While much of the specifics will have to be dealt with in
legislation, this principle can be applied to a general constitutional model.

Section F – A New Model
Introduction

The primary assertion of this thesis is that no one constitutional model will be
able to achieve the goal of child protection on its own. This is because of the
varying weaknesses and strengths of the various models and the range of legal
situations to which a constitutional norm will have to apply. Rather, any new
model must represent a compromise, a conglomeration of the various models.
This section will aim to draw together the advantages of various models into one
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combined model. The guiding considerations will first be briefly recapped.
Thereafter, the proposed combined model will be summarised.

Supporting the Family

It has been observed that the best way to protect children is to support their
families and give them the opportunities to thrive. Any constitutional order
should respect the family as the primary unit group in society. The social policy
advantages of this emphasis are obvious and have been dealt with above. The
Constitution should pledge the state to support the family and protect it from
attack. Likewise, in individual cases, courts should be compelled to consider the
welfare and survival of the family as a primary consideration, subject only to the
interests of its individual members. Parents too must be afforded rights.

However these guarantees and rights should not extend to guaranteeing parents
or the family natural and imprescriptible rights superior and anterior to positive
law. Such guarantees afford parents and families a level of legal protection that is
unhelpfully difficult to mitigate. As has been illustrated, this level of protection
has absolutely no reasonable justification. It does however cause many serious
problems.

The Rights of the Child

In the first place, parental and family protections should be subordinated when
certain fundamental children‘s rights have been infringed or are likely to be
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infringed. An exhaustive discussion of the rights that should be afforded would
be beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain fundamental rights can be
proposed. These rights would fall under two primary categories, namely
substantive and procedural rights.

Obviously, the choice of rights and the wording of their provision will be crucial.
However much of this legislating would be pointless unless the state‘s obligation
towards the vindication of these rights is altered. It must be remembered that a
significant body of unenumerated rights were afforded to children under the 1937
Constitution. Therefore, the state must be given a positive obligation and an
active jurisdiction to enforce these rights. The vindication of these rights may
require short term action such as a court order to enforce a necessary operation.
However, they may also require permanent action such as where a child‘s right to
life or health is under threat. As already discussed, because of the unusual power
of enforcement imposed on the state in respect of these rights, they should
probably be provided for by way of an explicit and exhaustive schedule.

Protecting the Interests of the Child

However, regardless of attempts to make the law more concerned with problem
solving and supporting families, it must be accepted that the courts will, in some
cases, be called on to make a definitive ruling in matters concerning the child.
Consequently, a standard should be set to protect children in legal proceedings. It
is proposed that the most effective standard is that proposed by Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit. Namely, in any legal proceedings regarding the placement of the
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child the court should attempt to implement ―the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the child‘s growth and development‖101. The
advantages of the standard were discussed in detail in chapter three102. This
standard most effectively reconciles the potentially conflicting policies of
protecting children from harm and preventing unnecessary removals from
families. It is also appropriate for dealing with situations such as custody
proceedings involving both parents.

Summary

As a starting point, the Constitution should stress the importance of the family
and its role as the primary unit group in society, deserving of protection. This
must be ameliorated by a promise on the part of the state to support families.
This represents an attempt to produce a model more concerned with problem
solving. The state should also recognise certain conditional parental rights to the
custody of their children. However, these rights should be without prejudice to
certain indefeasible minimum standards of parenting, protected by children‘s
rights. These children‘s rights should be coupled with a burden on the state to
ensure their enforcement. In this way, a shift in concentration on the protection
of children instead of on parental fault is achieved. Finally, the Constitution
should guarantee that in any placement decisions regarding children, the court
will attempt to secure the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding
the child‘s growth and development.
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The aims of this model are, broadly, four fold. Firstly, the model enunciates the
state‘s respect of the family and of parents. Secondly, the model aims to make
the state more active in its support of the family and to be more holistic and less
adversarial in its organisation of legal proceedings relating to the family. Thirdly,
the state guarantees its protection of certain indefeasible children‘s rights and its
obligation to defend them. Finally, the model aims to set a broad standard to
govern legal proceedings relating to children, namely the ‗least detrimental
alternative‘ standard.

Section G – Applications of a New Model

Introduction

This thesis began in chapter one by outlining the current state of the
constitutional law and by highlighting some of the weaknesses of the current
order. Consequently, having proposed an alternative model, the applications of
that model of this new model should be assessed. Two distinct applications will
be assessed in turn.

The North Western Health Board v HW and CW/Baby Janice Situation

The judgment of North Western Health Board v HW and CW103 provoked
considerable disquiet in the legal academic community in Ireland104. The court‘s
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decision was seen as unreasonably subjugating the rights of the child. However it
is submitted that concerns over the factual result were somewhat misplaced. In a
sense, the result of the case is not as galling as it is often described. Denham J
highlighted the weaknesses of the state‘s position: ―There was no particular
reason why this child should be tested for PKU. There was no relevant family
history. There were no circumstances which made it particularly apt for the child
to have the test.‖105 Furthermore, only one form of testing was made available
and the test was not made compulsory by the legislature, in this country or in any
country106.

It could be argued that even if the Supreme Court considered itself capable of
considering the rights of the child – as it surely would under the proposed model
– they would still have found in favour of the parents. This is because it is not
obvious that any serious right of the child is being substantially infringed.

Ultimately however, reform of the procedure would be welcome and for many
reasons. Firstly, it would make cases like HW and CW107 less objectionable and
ostensibly more equitable by properly taking account of the rights and interests
of children. Secondly, it would expressly provide for situations such as the one in
Baby Janice108 where the courts feel obliged to take action. This form of
extraordinary court enforcement on the basis of constitutional protections should
surely be laid out in as explicit a fashion as is possible.

Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running to Stand Still?, (2007)
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new order would allow the courts to
deal effectively with more complex, unforeseen cases due to the fact that it
would deal more specifically and explicitly with rights. We might expect to see
more complicated cases involving children‘s rights because Ireland‘s recent
immigration experience is likely to produce a far more culturally diverse society.
Within such a society, minority ethnic and religious groups may enforce
practices on children that might be considered harmful and contrary to societal
norms. This phenomenon in the United Kingdom – a country with a longer and
more extensive experience of immigration - is well described by Caroline
Bridge109.

However a more subtle application of the model might be the use of the problemsolving model and case conferencing. A conference could be convened including
the parents, healthcare professionals and social workers. This conference could
then propose a plan of action to deal with the issue at hand. A potential result in
the HW and CW case is that another form of testing could have been proposed. In
any event, the procedure seems far more suited to the process of complex
medical decision-making than the zero-sum nature of court proceedings.
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The Baby Ann Situation

The deficiencies of the law as it stands relating to custody disputes in the Baby
Ann110 mould111 have been assessed in chapter one. In a similar manner to the
above situation, it is as much the judicial decision-making method as the actual
result occasioned that was of concern. Considerations of the child‘s welfare were
largely subjugated to the rights and privileges of the marital parent. Moreover,
the process creates a zero-sum mentality and a winner-take-all result. This is a
wholly inappropriate to deal with families and the upbringing of children. The
new model would rectify these flaws.

In the first place, the new constitutional model would mandate that the courts
take a more holistic, problem-solving approach. The courts‘ sole role should not
be solely to decide which party‘s rights are superior. Rather, the courts should
attempt to implement a policy that most helps all parties and supports the
families. This creates a problem, of course, in this type of case because the whole
issue at hand in such cases is that the relevant family is not easily established112.
However it is submitted that in such cases the courts can, by relaxing the
importance of rights and attempting to promote the family structures in which the
child has an interest, produce results that recognise the value and accord
importance to all competing parties, even if the privileges afforded in the
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judgment fall short of what certain parties had hoped for. This could be done by
giving extensive visiting and participation rights to the parents who fail in the
proceedings. The case conference could be especially useful in this respect.

However, ultimately a decision will have to be made as to custody in such cases.
One cannot precisely predict what the effect of any constitutional model might be
on complicated custody cases such as the ones in question. These cases involve
idiosyncratic factual issues and only a court can definitively produce a legal
conclusion. One can, however, speculate as to the way in which a new
constitutional order might frame the case.

The first and most crucial difference is that the courts would not impose any
presumption that the child‘s best interests are found in the marital family. The
court would acknowledge the importance of the family and the conditional rights
of the biological parent and retain them as factors for consideration. The courts
should also consider the relevant rights of the child.

However, the ultimate decision must be made according to some accepted
standard. It is submitted that such a case should not be considered under the
context of some state intervention standard. While the adoptive parents may have
come into the child‘s custody through state aid, they are clearly separate actors to
the state. As mentioned above, the proposed measure for dealing with any child
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placement proceedings is the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit standard113. The
flexibility of this standard is well illustrated in this context.

In the final pages of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child114, the authors
considered the application of this standard to such disputes. They quote
extensively from their fictitious ‗Judge Baltimore‘ espousing a dispassionate and
laudable approach to such cases. The Judge begins by pointing out that whatever
the judicial result, there will be hardship115. His approach is to try to limit that
hardship as much as possible. He says that a judge should ignore his own
emotions and experiences because, ―these feelings should compel me to place
child with its biological parents, as compensation for their suffering‖.116
Adopting a utilitarian approach, he concludes the lesser harm is done by
awarding custody to the psychological parent as this harms only the biological
parent while the alternative will often harm the child and the psychological
parent. The judge espouses a social policy of increasing the number of adequate
parents and concludes: ―Only in the implementation of this policy does there lie a
real opportunity for beginning to break the cycle of sickness and hardship
bequeathed from one generation to the next by adults who as children were
denied the least detrimental alternative.‖117
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However even after this seemingly decisive result, the holistic, pro-family focus
could have an influence. This is because while custody has been granted, it has
been granted in the child‘s interests and not because any set of rights have been
deemed superior. A hypothetical application could be where a court orders a case
conference to decide on the degree and organization of the unsuccessful parents‘
access to the child. This might result in increased access for the parents who are
not granted custody. While one might argue that this would be unlikely to be
successful, it should be remembered that failure to come to a consensus would
result further legal proceedings as to the issue.

Section H – Conclusion

The central argument of this thesis should be briefly summarised at this point.
Chapter one proposed that the Constitution is in need of amendment. This was
due to the fact that it is incapable of adequately protecting children and unsuited
to judicial reform. The current constitutional provisions on the child and the
family have lead to controversial and somewhat perverse logical judgments in
courts118. Chapter two continued this argument by proposing that underlying
constitutional philosophy should be re-assessed and replaced. The 1930s Roman
Catholic philosophy that grounds the Constitution is anachronistic and is
inappropriate in today‘s Ireland. Equally, if natural law was ever an appropriate
basis of constitutional law in any state at any time, it is no longer so in this state.
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These changes would make it possible for a new constitutional schedule to be
adopted and to be adopted democratically and on the basis of objective criteria.
Chapter three set out a range of alternative models. The central argument of the
chapter was that many of the models held up as potentially providing the answer
in the area of constitutional child protection are flawed. They might, if adopted,
make matters worse for some children in some cases. The obvious synthesis of
this dialectic is that any new constitutional model should involve a combination
of models, attempting to draw on the best aspects of each.

Chapter four sought to illustrate how this could be achieved. It was emphasised
that we must recognise the advantages and limitations of each model proposed.
Specifically, it was proposed that the new constitutional order should retain its
recognition and its guarantee to protect the family, at least to a certain extent.
However it was argued that the state should place more of an emphasis on
supporting and helping families and the judicial system should focus more on
holistic approaches to family legal disputes than to zero-sum, winner-take-all
proceedings. Nevertheless, the new constitutional order should recognise and
guarantee certain parental and children‘s rights in the area. The latter should be
accompanied by a special obligation on the state to guarantee their enforcement.
Finally the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard was proposed as the guiding
constitutional standard. While it is accepted that one might reasonably conclude
that a different model would be more effective, it is surely incorrect to suggest
that the central argument is not valid. Ultimately, the adoption of any model must
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be based on objective criteria and not on any belief in the primordial supremacy
of parents or the family.
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